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Designing Regulation for Mobile Financial 
Markets 
Ilya Beylin* 
Prior scholarship advocates for international harmonization of financial regulation as 
a solution to the problem of cross-border regulatory arbitrage. The scholarship is theoretical 
and rests on the contention that financial institutions can simply depart from an unfavorable 
regulatory regime. This Paper contributes an empirical foundation to the concern that financial 
institutions relocate following regulation, while also deeply qualifying claims that effective 
regulation requires international harmonization. 
Using experience from swap markets following the Dodd-Frank Act, this Article 
provides the first empirical evidence that financial institutions migrate in response to 
derivatives regulation. This Article shows that U.S. banks substantially shifted inter-bank 
swap trading offshore while the delivery of swaps to U.S. customers did not decline. 
Building on this case study, the Article develops theory for what policy goals are more 
susceptible to subversion through migration. Policy goals concerned with regulating 
relationships between financial institutions and their customers (e.g., goals of customer 
protection) are less vulnerable to relocation than policy goals concerned with inter-relationships 
between financial institutions (e.g., reduction of systemic risk). This distinction reflects  
well-informed priors on the relative costs and benefits of cross-border arbitrage to providers of 
financial services and their customers. 
In exploring how relocation skirted some regulations and alternative regulatory designs 
for achieving the same policy goals, the Article solves a longstanding puzzle for international 
regulation. The claim that financial institutions can avoid territorially bounded regulation 
appears, on its face, suspect. If an institution truly removes its operations, what legitimate 
interest does a jurisdiction retain in regulating that institution? Through examining how 
operations may be restructured across borders, the Article shows that a lack of  
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Rich Hynes, Marcel Kahan, Mitchel Kane, Joshua Macey, Paul Mahoney, Anup Malani, William Moon, 
Saule Omarova, Alex Raskolnikov, Gabriel Rauterberg, Ed Rock, Andrew Verstein, David Zaring and 
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Second to Printer_Beylin (Do Not Delete) 2/26/2020  10:56 AM 
498 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:497 
harmonization: (a) does not affect whether a jurisdiction can unilaterally implement its policy 
goals, but (b) does narrow the range of regulatory designs available to achieve policy goals. 
Absent harmonization, jurisdictions may be limited to regulatory designs that are more 
difficult to implement, for instance, due to politics, administrative costs or other frictions 
affecting efficacious lawmaking, supervision, or enforcement. 
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A combination of sovereignty and mobility implies that private parties will be 
able to select between legal regimes.1 Where jurisdictions differ in how they regulate 
an activity, migration allows private parties to avoid regulation.2 Following the 
financial crisis, nations have sought to harmonize regulation of their financial 
institutions. A key premise to calls for international financial regulation has been 
the assertion that the mobility of financial institutions can undermine policy goals 
 
1. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956). 
2. See, e.g., Erin A. O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law, 67  
U. CHI. L. REV. 1151, 1163 (2000) (“Individuals and firms who have an incentive to minimize their 
transaction and information costs and an ability to choose legal regimes that accomplish this goal over 
time may cause the law to move toward efficiency, if only because inefficient regimes end up governing 
fewer and fewer people and transactions.”); Anup Malani, Valuing Laws as Local Amenities, 121  
HARV. L. REV. 1273, 1274 (2008) (proposing to measure value of laws through their impact on housing 
prices and wages). 
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carried out unilaterally.3 Proponents of this view frequently refer to jurisdictional 
selection as regulatory arbitrage.4 This Article both supports and challenges the 
conventional view, observing that financial institutions have undermined the current 
regime through relocation while explaining how the risks from offshore activity 
could be reduced through redesign of U.S. regulation. 
Scholars have theorized that jurisdictional selection occurs in response to a 
variety of legal regimes, including financial regulation.5 Scholars have also 
empirically studied jurisdictional selection in tax,6 corporate governance,7 and 
securities law.8 This Article is the first to empirically study jurisdictional selection in 
 
3. See William Moon, Regulating Offshore Finance, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2019); ERIC A. POSNER, 
LAST RESORT: THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE FUTURE OF BAILOUTS (2018); Yuliya Guseva, The 
SEC and Foreign Private Issuers: A Path to Optimal Public Enforcement, 59 B.C. L. REV. 2055 (2018); 
Kathryn Judge, The First Year: The Role of a Modern Lender of Last Resort, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 843, 
845 (2016); John C. Coffee, Jr., Extraterritorial Financial Regulation: Why E.T. Can’t Come Home, 99 
CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1270 (2014); Pierre-Hugues Verdier, The Political Economy of International 
Financial Regulation, 88 IND. L.J. 1405, 1437 (2013); Chis Brummer, How International Financial Law 
Works (and How It Doesn’t), 99 GEO. L.J. 257, 267 (2011); Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89  
TEX. L. REV. 227 (2010); Yesha Yadav, Specter of Sisyphus: Re-Making International Financial Regulation 
after the Global Financial Crisis, 24 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 83, 85–86 (2010); Jonathan Rodden & Susan 
Rose-Ackerman, Does Federalism Preserve Markets?, 83 VA. L. REV. 1521 (1997); Frank Partnoy, Financial 
Derivatives and the Costs of Regulatory Arbitrage, 22 J. CORP. L. 211, 227 (1997). 
4. See Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association v. CFTC, 67 F. Supp. 3d 373,  
435–36 (D.D.C. 2014) [hereinafter SIFMA v. CFTC]. 
5. Bruce G. Carruthers & Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Regulatory Races: The Effects of Jurisdictional 
Competition on Regulatory Standards, 54 J. ECON. LITERATURE 52 (2016) (reviewing literature). 
6. Eric L. Talley, Corporate Inversions and the Unbundling of Regulatory Competition, 101  
VA. L. REV. 1649 (2015); Mitchell A. Kane & Edward B. Rock, Corporate Taxation and International 
Charter Competition, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1229 (2008). 
7. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State 
Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1441 (1992); Roberta Romano, Law as a 
Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, I J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 280–081 (1985); Ralph  
K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL  
STUD. 251 (1977); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE 
L.J. 663 (1974). 
8. Scholarship in securities regulation supports that jurisdictional competition may create a race 
to the top. Starting with John Coffee, legal scholars have argued that some foreign firms list in the 
United States to “bond” themselves to heightened disclosure and liability standards. John C. Coffee, 
Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its 
Implications, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 641 (1999). Bonding allows foreign firms with high-quality governance 
that exceeds minimum standards applicable in its home jurisdiction to credibly signal and commit to 
maintaining that heightened standard of governance. Empirical assessments of the bonding hypothesis 
have generally found supporting evidence. René M. Stulz, Globalization, Corporate Finance, and the Cost 
of Capital, 12 J. APP. CORP. FIN. 8 (1999); John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of 
Cross-Listings and Stock Market Competition on International Corporate Governance, (Columbia Law 
School Center for Law and Economic Studies, Working Paper No. 205, 2002); William A. Reese, Jr.  
& Michael S. Weisbach, Protection of Minority Shareholder Interests, Cross-Listings in the United States, 
and Subsequent Equity Offerings, 66 J. FIN. ECON. 65 (2002) (obtaining empirical results supporting the 
bonding hypothesis); Craig Doidge, U.S. Cross-Listings and the Private Benefits of Control: Evidence from 
Dual Class Firms, 72 J. FIN. ECON. 519, (2004) (obtaining empirical results supporting the bonding 
hypothesis); Craig Doidge, G. Andrew Karolyi, & René M. Stulz, Why Are Foreign Firms Listed in the 
U.S. Worth More?, 71 J. FIN. ECON. 205 (2004) (obtaining empirical results supporting the bonding 
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response to derivatives regulation and provides strong evidence that financial 
institutions massively relocated operations following regulation.9 This evidence 
substantiates that unilateral regulation may be ineffectual due to the mobility of 
financial institutions.10 However, this Paper also identifies that the ability of 
 
hypothesis); John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156  
U. PA. L. REV. 230, 284–4292 (2007) (reviewing evidence of the bonding hypothesis); C. Fritz Foley, 
Paul Goldsmith-Pinkham, Jonathan Greenstein & Eric Zwick, Opting Out of Good Governance, 46  
J. EMP. FIN. 93 (2018); Leyuan You, Janet D. Payne & Steve Wen-Jen Lin, Do Multiple Foreign Listings 
Create Value for Firms?, 69 Q. REV. ECON. FIN. 134 (2018). Across scholarship looking at government 
response to private responsiveness, conclusions differ on whether there is a race-to-the-top, a  
race-to-the-bottom, or simply meandering among jurisdictions in these areas. Carruthers & Lamoreaux, 
supra note 5 (surveying a broad set of academic studies and finding that “dire predictions of those who 
assert that more stringent regulation of business will produce divestment and flight have seldom been 
realized in practice”); see Emiliano M. Catan & Marcel Kahan, The Law and Finance of Antitakeover 
Statutes, 68 STAN. L. REV. 629, 632 (2016) (finding inter-state variations on some anti-takeover 
statutory provisions having little impact on firm performance contrary to prior findings); Stephen  
J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of Securities 
Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903 (1997) (building on the “law as product” model to argue that issuers 
should be able to select the jurisdiction whose regime governs their securities issuances, thus enabling 
jurisdictions to create specialized regimes and issuers to sort between them). See generally Edward  
J. Kane, Accelerating Inflation, Technological Innovation, and the Decreasing Effectiveness of Banking 
Regulation, 36 J. FIN. 355 (1981) (explaining how through private adaptation and re-regulation, markets 
and the government engage in a Hegelian dialectic moving society through “an endless series of 
conflicts between economic and political power”). 
9. This Article does not take a strong position on whether U.S. banks’ migration of swap activity 
to foreign subsidiaries is undesirable. As other scholars have observed, jurisdictional selection in 
response to regulatory change can be desirable or not depending on the quality of those regulations. 
Fleischer, supra note 3, at 234 (2010) (“Whether a particular regulatory arbitrage technique is good or 
bad necessarily depends on a prior question of whether a particular regulation enhances social 
welfare.”). Whether swap regulations adopted under the Dodd Frank Act are on net socially desirable 
is a subject beyond the scope of this Article. Other scholars have described those regulations as 
desirable—and from this point of view, the flight of swap activity observed in this Article represents 
undesirable regulatory arbitrage. See Coffee, supra note 3, at 1270; Verdier, supra note 3, at 1445 
(reviewing the theory that “some countries have incentives to maintain inefficiently low standards [of 
financial regulation] because the costs are borne by others”); SIFMA v. CFTC, 67 F. Supp. 3d at 431 
(referring to “immeasurable” benefits of preventing future financial crises). Irrespective of whether the 
regulations embody socially desirable policy, adaptation to regulation creates deadweight loss. Louis 
Kaplow, Optimal Taxation with Costly Enforcement and Evasion, 43 J. PUB. ECON. 221, 221 (1990) 
(“The literature on optimal taxation considers how revenue can be raised in a manner that minimizes 
the distortion of behavior.”). See generally Dhammika Dharmapala, THE ECONOMICS OF TAX 
AVOIDANCE AND EVASION (2017). 
10. For background on the architecture of international financial regulation, see Chris 
Brummer, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RULE MAKING IN THE 21ST CENTURY 
(2012); DANIEL K. TARULLO, BANKING ON BASEL, THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL 
REGULATION (2008); ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004); see also JACK  
L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005); Edward F. Greene 
& Joshua L. Boehm, The Limits of “Name-and-Shame” in International Financial Regulation, 97 
CORNELL L. REV. 1083 (2012); Chris Brummer, Territoriality As a Regulatory Technique: Notes from the 
Financial Crisis, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 499, 515 (2011) (arguing that globalization has undermined 
regulatory capacities); Eric J. Pan, Challenge of International Cooperation and Institutional Design in 
Financial Supervision: Beyond Transgovernmental Networks, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 243 (2010); Douglas  
W. Arner & Michael W. Taylor, The Global Financial Crisis and the Financial Stability Board: Hardening 
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financial institutions to subvert policy goals through relocation depends also on the 
regulatory objective in question and the regulatory devices used to achieve it. Based 
on observation of financial services mobility and refinement to the conventional 
theory of regulatory arbitrage, this Paper identifies policy goals more and less likely 
to be subverted through migration and proposes means for more effective  
unilateral regulation. 
Swap market reform following the financial crisis serves as the setting for this 
case study of the vulnerability of regulation to relocation. The Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (the “Dodd-Frank Act”) 
initiated comprehensive regulation of the swaps market. Regulations adopted under 
Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act not only impose substantial obligations11 on swap 
market participants but also provide public data on all U.S. swap transactions. 
Although regulation of swaps markets under the Dodd-Frank Act was based on an 
international framework, the United States has in some key areas gone beyond the 
European Union and other jurisdictions in restricting swap activity.12 Since data on 
outstanding swaps became available in late 2013, the U.S. swaps market imploded.13 
As shown in Figure I.A, the volume of interest rate swap transactions14 has declined 
by over a third15 since data became available: 
 
the Soft Law of International Financial Regulation?, 32 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 488 (2009); Joel  
P. Trachtman, International Regulatory Competition, Externalization, and Jurisdiction, 34  
HARV. INT’L L.J. 47 (1993). 
11. See infra Part I. 
12. Members of the Group of 20 nations (“G-20”) endorsed a multi-dimensional regulatory 
framework for over the counter (“OTC”) derivatives markets. FIN. STABILITY BD., OTC DERIVATIVES 
REFORMS PROGRESS: REPORT FROM THE FSB CHAIRMAN FOR THE G20 LEADERS’ SUMMIT 1 (2013). 
Notwithstanding general commitments to a shared framework, members of the G-20 have 
implemented varying regimes. This Article does not purport to identify all the material discrepancies 
across G-20 regimes. See also infra notes 23 and 60 and surrounding text (discussing material differences 
in pre-trade regulation). Although perhaps of limited social import, from a scholarly perspective, the 
European Union’s relative lack of publicly reported granular data on swap transactions is another 
noticeable gap between the regimes. 
13. As discussed further throughout this Article, notional amounts are used to track changes in 
levels of swap activity. This is a standard within the industry, and U.S. and foreign regulators follow 
swap market activity based on outstanding notional amounts. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER 
OF THE CURRENCY, QUARTERLY REPORT ON BANK TRADING AND DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES 13 
(2017 Q1) (explaining “[c]hanges in notional amounts are generally reasonable reflections of business 
activity and can provide insight into potential revenue and operational issues”). 
14. The empirical results of this paper are based on the interest rate swap market, which is the 
largest swap market. Generally speaking, the same regulatory scheme applies to interest rate swaps, 
foreign currency swaps, equity swaps, credit default swaps, energy, metal, agricultural, weather, health, 
and other swaps. As discussed below, the Securities and Exchange Commission authored many of the 
rules governing the small fraction of swaps based on a single company’s performance or the 
performance of a small number of companies (including single name credit default swaps). See Stephen 
J. Lubben & Rajesh P. Narayanan, CDS and the Resolution of Financial Distress, 24 J. APPLIED  
CORP. FIN. 129, 131 (2012) (discussing single name credit default swap market). 
15. For ease of review, CFTC data is smoothed based on a four-week running window and 
presented in trillions of U.S. dollars. Except where specified otherwise, the CFTC data is on  
fixed-to-floating interest rate swaps across all currencies. 
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Figure I.A: U.S. Swap Market Activity 
As is the case with many other industries, swaps are provided through a 
combination of two markets—a market between providers and consumers, and a 
wholesale market serving providers. This Paper exploits data on three distinct 
market segments to identify an exodus of swap activity offshore. Comprehensive 
data on U.S. swap market activity from the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC) shows that customer usage of swaps has only increased 
subsequent to regulation.16 In contrast, CFTC data on U.S. wholesale markets 
shows a decline of nearly fifty percent. This contrast creates a puzzle, how could 
the consumption of a product increase while the wholesale markets enabling the 
delivery of that product massively decline? Data from the Office of the Comptroller 
of the Currency (OCC) on the worldwide interest rate swap activity of U.S. banks 
and their subsidiaries unlocks that puzzle.17 While wholesale swap markets in the 
United States have imploded, the global participation of U.S. banks in wholesale 
markets remains constant. Financial institutions continue to provide U.S. customers 
with swaps to the same or greater extent as they have prior to the implementation 
of regulations, while they have moved inter-bank wholesale swap activity offshore. 
 
16. CFTC data is taken from the weekly swaps report available here: https://www.cftc.gov/
MarketReports/SwapsReports/Archive/index.htm [https://perma.cc/L85Y-4W5Y] ( last visited 
Nov. 11, 2019). 
17. OCC data is taken from what is now Graph 11 in the Quarterly Reports on Bank Trading 
and Derivatives Activities. An archive of the reports is available here: https://www.occ.gov/topics/
capital-markets/financial-markets/derivatives/derivatives-quarterly-report.html [https://perma.cc/
RGX4-FQ46] ( last visited Nov. 18, 2019). Except where otherwise specified, the OCC data is on all 
interest rate contracts across all currencies. 
Second to Printer_Beylin (Do Not Delete) 2/26/2020  10:56 AM 
504 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:497 
These trends strongly support that the industry providing swaps reorganized in a 
manner that decreases the regulatory burdens of the Dodd-Frank Act.18 
The swap market experience enables testing and refinement of theory for 
when international harmonization is necessary for achieving policy objectives. 
Goals of customer protection, or more broadly the regulation of markets between 
financial services providers and their customers, are relatively immune to regulatory 
arbitrage through relocation. Although prior work has looked at the mobility of 
financial institutions as the constraint on unilateral regulation, the mobility of 
financial institutions alone is insufficient to avoid regulatory objectives governing 
provision of financial services. Under conventional territorial norms, regulatory 
obligations attach not only based on the location of the service provider but also 
the location of the customer. These norms are reflected in the international reach 
of U.S. financial regulations generally and in the reach of swap market regulations 
specifically. As a result, it is insufficient for a financial institution to relocate for its 
services to escape regulatory ambit. The customer must also relocate operations to 
enable avoidance. The swap market experience supports that customers generally 
do not relocate. The balance of benefits and costs to relocation tends to make 
migration unattractive for customers, particularly where the regulation has customer 
protection as an objective and is competently designed and implemented. As a 
result, markets between financial institutions and their customers are relatively 
immune to regulatory arbitrage through relocation. This Paper develops a 
framework for understanding why customers generally do not collude with financial 
services providers in reducing regulatory burdens and when they may do so. In 
contrast, markets between financial services providers are more mobile based on 
the empirical observations and theory developed in this Paper. International 
harmonization may substantially further objectives relating to intra-financial 
institution markets such as the containment of systemic risk. 
This Article not only identifies the migration of systemic risk beyond the 
ambit of U.S. regulations but also explains ways the United States may unilaterally 
address this threat. The exodus of swap trading to less-regulated offshore 
subsidiaries need not threaten the health of the U.S. financial system. Instead of 
preventing activities that increase risk at the foreign subsidiary level, domestic 
regulators can stem the flow of risk from foreign subsidiaries to their U.S. parents. 
Yet, adopting these protections requires both coordination between governmental 
bodies and discipline not to abandon them during market distress. Effective 
unilateral regulation to prevent the influx of systemic risk from foreign subsidiaries 
requires cooperation between the CFTC, SEC, and banking regulators that has yet 
 
18. Ian Acker, Strength in Transparency: Migrating Systemic Risk Through Harmonization of 
Reporting Requirements for OTC Derivatives, 49 GEO. WASH. INT’L. REV. 947, 962–63 (2017) (discussing 
regulatory arbitrage); John Welling, In Defense of the Dealers: Why the SEC Should Allow Substituted 
Compliance with the European Union for Security-Based Swap Dealers, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 909, 927 
(2016) (discussing regulatory arbitrage); Christina Parajon Skinner, Whistleblowers and Financial 
Innovation, 94 N.C. L. REV. 861, 915 (2016) (discussing inter-jurisdictional regulatory arbitrage). 
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to manifest. Moreover, ex ante prevention of risk accumulation may be more 
effective than its ex post containment through installing regulatory sandbags 
between U.S. banking entities and their foreign subsidiaries. 
Seen in light of alternatives for achieving regulatory priorities on a unilateral 
basis, international harmonization becomes a helpful means to regulation rather 
than a necessary predicate. International harmonization eases the difficult problems 
of regulatory design created when regulated domestic activity interacts with 
unregulated (or differently regulated) foreign activity. International harmonization 
may be especially desirable where institutional problems impair unilateral 
lawmaking, such as the challenges of coordination between independent financial 
agencies (and Congressional committees). But international harmonization is 
generally not strictly necessary for preventing private mobility from undermining a 
range of policy goals. Scholarship concerned with regulatory arbitrage through 
relocation not only exaggerates its threat to policymaking but fails to acknowledge 
cases in which the threat evolves from a combination of private re-ordering and 
public bodies’ failure in designing or implementing unilateral regulations.19 
This view also resolves an ostensible paradox in the traditional criticisms of 
regulatory avoidance through relocation. The conventional view is that financial 
service providers can undermine regulatory priorities through relocation. Yet, if the 
lawmaker does not err20 towards an unrealistically narrow definition of location, 
relocation not only exempts financial activity from regulation but also vitiates the 
regulatory interests in the activity as its locus and consequences on counterparties 
no longer touch the relevant jurisdiction.21 On first pass, relocation changes the 
substance of activity in a manner that should be respected in an international order 
built on territorial deference. Relocation can, nevertheless, pose a challenge to 
regulation—even modest regulation that does not have extraterritorial aspiration. 
As introduced above and explored in this Article, lack of harmonization limits the 
scope of tools available for achieving national priorities. As one example, prior to 
 
19. A more troubling motive for encouraging other jurisdictions to conform to domestic 
regulation is the political interest of jurisdictions in retaining their financial firms rather than see them 
move abroad. Exploring the protectionist undertones of the calls for harmonization, as well as the 
legitimate policy interests in minimizing social losses due directly to relocation (i.e., deadweight loss), 
are left for further work. 
20. If the lawmaker does err in adopting an overly narrow definition, “exploitation” of the 
definition should be expected, and it is easy to sympathize with the lawyer providing guidance on how 
to accurately albeit conveniently construe the provision. Naturally, language may be purposefully or 
inadvertently ambiguous (and while those two cases are significantly different, they oftentimes cannot 
be distinguished in the context of multi-member institutions such as Congress). For purposes of this 
discussion, exploitation of inadvertent ambiguity in the geographic scope of regulatory regimes is 
neglected. 
21. It is worth repeating that financial services are just that, services, and thus flow under 
contracts between identifiable parties. Thus, the direct consequences of financial services are largely 
isolated to the financial service provider and recipient, as opposed to, for example, environmental 
concerns such as pollution where weather patterns or currents can lead to harms beyond the 
jurisdictions of parties involved in the commercial transactions. 
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Dodd-Frank, concerns arose that swap dealers were charging customers higher 
prices than dealers were charging each other. This was seen as a potential 
manifestation of anti-competitive behavior. Rather than rely on traditional antitrust 
tools, Congress imposed a requirement that dealers trade on open, multi-lateral 
platforms where dealers would not control whether the price they offered was taken 
by another dealer or a customer.22 This was a creative, market-based method for 
addressing a potential antitrust problem. Through relocation to the United 
Kingdom and other jurisdictions that did not impose the platform execution 
requirement, dealers were able to skirt this novel remedy to concerns with 
oligopolistic prices.23 This is just one example of how relocation may subvert means 
of achieving regulatory priorities, leaving states with more limited arsenals to 
accomplish policy goals. 
Through detailed attention to market structure, regulation, and data on 
financial activity, this Paper supports and elaborates conventional theory on the 
limitations of unilateral financial regulation. Part I of this Article provides an 
introduction to swaps, the markets in which they trade, and their regulation under 
Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act. Part II of this Article presents the trends on which 
the findings of massive migration in the wholesale market are based on. Part III 
considers the implications of the swap market experience for unilateral regulatory 
efforts. A brief conclusion follows. 
I. SWAP TRANSACTIONS AND THE STRUCTURE OF SWAP MARKETS 
Swaps are the dominant form of derivatives contracts used by parties to 
exchange risk in financial markets. This Part introduces the swap instrument, 
explains how swaps are used and traded, and then covers the extensive regulation 
of swap markets pursuant to rules promulgated under the Dodd-Frank Act. 
A. What Is a Swap? 
The term “swap” has ambiguous contours but some definite and frequently 
encountered instantiations. A practical definition of “swap” can take the following 
form: “a bilateral agreement to exchange future cash flows based on some agreed 
formula.”24 An example is a floating-for-fixed interest rate swap, which calls for (a) 
payments by one party based on the product of a floating interest rate and a fixed 
 
22. See Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Dan M. Berkovitz, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES 
TRADING COMM’N (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/
berkovitzstatement110518a [https://perma.cc/N88T-KJG3] ( last visited Nov. 18, 2019). 
23. MANAGED FUNDS ASS’N, COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CFTC AND EU MIFID II/MIFIR 
DERIVATIVES TRADING AND TRANSPARENCY REGIMES AND MFA RECOMMENDATIONS TO 
FACILITATE COMPARABILITY / EQUIVALENCE 2 (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.managedfunds.org/
wp-content/uploads/2017/10/MFA-Comparative-Analysis-of-SEF-Regime-vs-EU-MiFID-
II-MiFIR-Derivatives-Final.pdf. [https://perma.cc/XLL4-GHSG] ( last visited Nov. 18, 2019). 
24. Lawrence C. Tondel, Introduction to Derivatives, in DERIVATIVES: LEGAL PRACTICE AND 
STRATEGIES § 1.01[B][3], 1-1, 1-9 (Robert D. Aicher ed., Supp. 2011). 
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amount, called the notional, in exchange for (b) payments by the counterparty based 
on the product of a fixed interest rate and the same notional amount. This example 
illustrates the origins of the name “swap” because the instrument allows the parties 
to swap payment obligations based on two interest rates—a floating rate and a fixed 
rate. The example of an interest rate swap is particularly useful to illuminating swap 
markets because the great majority of the global swap market consists of interest 
rate swaps.25 Swaps can be used to provide contingent payments based on a variety 
of events, ranging from changes in financial indices such as inflation, currency, and 
interest rates, to changes in prices of tangible commodities such as energy, metals 
and foodstuffs, to manifestations of tangible risks such as weather events and 
longevity trends.26 Another example of a swap is a natural gas swap, which may 
require (a) payments by one party based on the product of the market price per unit 
of natural gas in a particular region and a notional amount representing units of 
natural gas, in exchange for (b) payments by the counterparty based on the product 
of a fixed per-unit price of natural gas and the notional amount. 
B. How Are Swaps Used and How Are They Traded? 
Having offered some definitional background on swaps, it is helpful to discuss 
how swap transactions are used and the markets in which swaps trade.27 First, 
consider the case of a hedging natural gas producer, Party A. Party A has financed 
itself with floating rate bonds. To hedge risk on its floating rate bonds, Party A has 
entered into a fixed-for-floating interest rate swap with a large bank, Party B. Given 
volatility in energy markets, Party A has also hedged its exposure to the price of 
natural gas by entering into a floating-for-fixed swap based on an index of current 
natural gas prices. As a result of its natural gas production, bond issuance and the 
two swap trades, Party A would (a) receive payments for its natural gas that floated 
with market rates, (b) trade those floating rate payments for fixed amounts due 
under the natural gas swap, (c) use fixed amounts received under the natural gas 
swap to satisfy its fixed payment obligations under the interest rate swap, and (d) 
use the floating amounts received under the interest rate swap to make interest 
payments due under the bonds. Through the two swap transactions, Party A has 
locked in steady cash flows for its employees, vendors, investors and other 
stakeholders. De-risking in this stylized manner is a powerfully attractive 
 
25. BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, OTC DERIVATIVES STATISTICS AT  
END-JUNE 2016 (2016) (“The interest rate segment continues to account for the vast majority of 
outstanding OTC derivatives. At end-June 2016, the notional amount of outstanding OTC interest rate 
derivatives contracts totaled $438 trillion, which represented 80% of the global OTC derivatives 
market.”). 
26. Kai Kaufhold, How to Price Longevity Swaps, 77 REINSURANCE NEWS 18 (2013). 
27. See Jonathan R. Macey, Derivative Instruments: Lessons for the Regulatory State, 21  
J. CORP. L. 69, 72 (1995) (“Derivatives are a means to risk management . . . . At best, the use of 
derivative instruments permits parties in financial transactions to shift the risks associated with such 
transactions to the parties that have the comparative advantage in bearing the risk.”). 
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proposition that derivatives markets are able to offer to businesses and explains a 
key role of derivatives in the real economy. 
In addition to hedging, derivatives may be used to speculate.28 Given a view 
as to future market movements, derivatives may be used to express that view. For 
example, consider a hedge fund that expects the price of natural gas to go up. To 
express that view (i.e., to go long on natural gas), the hedge fund could enter into a 
fixed-for-floating swap under which it pays a fixed rate to receive the market price 
of natural gas.29 Similarly, a hedge fund that expected interest rates to go down could 
express that view (i.e., go short interest rates) by entering into a floating-for-fixed 
interest rate swap under which it pays a floating interest rate to receive a fixed rate.30 
The preceding examples of the hedging natural gas producer and the 
speculating hedge fund provide an introduction to how swaps are used.31 However, 
the discussion leaves an important question unaddressed, namely, how do firms 
enter into swaps, or in other words, who supplies swaps to meet market participants’ 
demand for swaps?32 
When a party wants to enter into a loan to buy a house, the party typically goes 
to a bank or another mortgage originator. Similarly, when a party desires to enter 
into a swap, the party goes to one of a handful of large financial institutions that 
serve as “swap dealers.”33 In the example above, Party B is a swap dealer.34 Swap 
 
28. Cf. Lynn A. Stout, Derivatives and the Legal Origin of the 2008 Credit Crisis, 1  
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1, 27 (2011) (arguing that the legalization of speculative over-the-counter 
derivatives trading under the Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000 led to the financial 
crisis); Timothy E. Lynch, Coming Up Short: The United States’ Second-Best Strategies for Corralling 
Purely Speculative Derivatives, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 545, 549 (2014) (arguing that purely speculating 
trades have negative externalities, destroy wealth, and are irrational). This Article uses speculation to 
refer to activity that is designed to profit either from market correction (i.e., arbitrage) or market  
growth (i.e., investment). 
29. Payments would be based on a notional amount, so the fixed payment made by the hedge 
fund would be based on the product of a fixed rate per unit of natural gas and the notional amount of 
natural gas. Similarly, the floating amount due to the hedge fund would be based on the market rate per 
unit of natural gas multiplied by the notional amount of natural gas. 
30. As with the natural gas speculator, payments are based on the notional amount of the 
interest rate swap. The floating amount due from the hedge fund would be the product of the floating 
rate and the notional amount. Conversely, the fixed amount due to the hedge fund would be the 
product of the market rate (e.g., three-month US LIBOR) and the notional amount. 
31. See Stephen J. Lubben, Subsidizing Liquidity or Subsidizing Markets? Safe Harbors, 
Derivatives, and Finance, 91 AM. BANKR. L.J. 463 (2017) (discussing how swaps may be used to hedge 
or speculate). 
32. For a succinct overview of the structure of derivatives markets, see MARK JICKLING  
& KATHLEEN ANN RUANE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41398, THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET 
REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: TITLE VII, DERIVATIVES 1–5 (2010). 
33. OCC, QUARTERLY REPORT ON BANK TRADING & DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES, SECOND 
QUARTER (2017) (“The four banks with the most derivative activity hold 89.6 percent of all derivatives, 
while the largest 25 banks account for nearly 100 percent of all contracts.”) 
34. As of the time this Article was being written, there were approximately 100 registered swap 
dealers as reflected in the registry of swap dealers maintained by the National Futures Association. 
SD/MSP Registry, NAT’L FUTURES ASS’N, https://www.nfa.futures.org/registration-membership/
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dealers serve as sources of liquidity to swap market participants, standing ready to 
meet demand from firms hedging, speculating or otherwise transacting in swaps.35 
Thus the natural gas producer36 would likely reach out to one or more swap 
dealers—directly or through a broker—with a request to provide pricing for a 
natural gas swap that could, in part or whole, hedge its expected production of 
natural gas. The swap dealer would estimate the cost it would incur to hedge that 
natural gas swap or maintain the risk of that swap on its balance sheet (referred to 
as “warehousing” the risk). Then, the dealer would respond with a price that 
represented its cost and a premium for profit.37 Assuming the transaction was 
executed, the swap dealer could then enter into an offsetting swap with another 
swap dealer that had itself acquired a short position, such as through transacting 
with the fund that was discussed above.38 
 
membership-and-directories.html#sdregistry [https://perma.cc/S3ET-G2P7] (last visited July 30, 
2018). 
35. Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1(a)(47) (2018); see also Further Definition of “Swap 
Dealer,” “Security-Based Swap Dealer,” “Major Swap Participant,” “Major Security-Based Swap 
Participant” and “Eligible Contract Participant,” 77 Fed. Reg. 30,596, 30,59899 (May 23, 2012) 
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 240). 
36. The natural gas producer in the preceding example may be referred to as a natural long for 
natural gas and a natural short for interest rates. That is because, vis-à-vis prices of natural gas, the 
firm’s role as producer of natural gas gives it a long position in natural gas (i.e., the firm has natural gas 
to sell at market prices so that increases in prices redound to its benefit and decreases in prices reduce 
the firm’s profits). Similarly, vis-à-vis interest rates, the firm’s role as issuer of floating rate bonds gives 
it a short position in interest rates (i.e., the firm’s profits increase as interest rates go down and decrease 
as interest rates go up). Conversely, the hedge fund’s speculative strategies can be expressed through a 
short position in natural gas and a long position in interest rates. Thus, the fund may be an ideal 
counterparty for the natural gas producer; however, in historical swap markets, the natural gas producer 
and the fund would rarely, if ever, transact directly. Rather, each of the parties would transact with a 
swap dealer. 
37. Costs reflect not only the cash flows expected to be due on offsetting transactions but a 
premium reflecting the credit risk of the customer. For a discussion of swap market structure including 
mechanisms to manage credit risk, see Ilya Beylin, A Reassessment of the Clearing Mandate: How the 
Clearing Mandate Affects Swap Trading Behavior and the Consequences for Systemic Risk, 68 RUTGERS  
L. REV. 1143, 1173–1189 (2015). Daniel Awrey further develops the description of swap market 
infrastructure and mechanisms used to manage counterparty credit risk to contrast pricing in swap 
markets with pricing in conventional equity markets. See Daniel Awrey, The Mechanisms of Derivatives 
Market Efficiency, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1104 (2016). 
38. Swap dealers may offset risk acquired through a series of customer transactions on a 
portfolio basis rather than offsetting risk on a transaction by transaction basis. See Tondel, supra note 
24, § 1.01[B][3], at 1–10 (“Often, one party to a swap is a derivatives dealer and the other party is a  
so-called ‘end user.’ . . . [A] professional derivatives dealer is generally not in the business of directly 
speculating on interest rates (or the future prices of any other underlying assets, indices, or reference 
rates). Rather, in the course of conducting its business, the derivatives dealer will generally strive to 
maintain a balanced portfolio of derivatives positions (e.g., entering some interest rate swaps where the 
dealer is obligated to make payments based on a fixed rate of interest, and others where the dealer’s 
payments are based on a floating rate of interest).”). 
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Figure II.B: The Customer Serving Market and the inter-Dealer Market 
Through sets of similar transactions, swap dealers serve as intermediaries of 
risk. Parties desiring to go long or short approach swap dealers seeking to enter into 
swap transactions.39 Swap dealers enter into these transactions and then find other 
parties (usually other swap dealers) to offload the risk to.40 Through the nexus of 
swap dealers, natural longs eventually meet natural shorts, and speculators, such as 
funds, provide liquidity to other market participants. Trading between swap-dealers 
creates a wholesale market, which enables swap dealers to serve their customers. 
Figure II.B above shows the end-user serving market and the wholesale inter-dealer 
market involved in the delivery of swaps to customers.41 
 
39. There is some debate regarding the extent to which commercial firms actually engage in 
swap contracts to manage their risks. See Wayne Guay & S.P Kothari, How Much Do Firms Hedge with 
Derivatives?, 70 J. FIN. ECON. 423 (2003). 
40. See Further Definition of “Swap Dealer,” “Security-Based Swap Dealer,” “Major Swap 
Participant,” “Major Security-Based Swap Participant” and “Eligible Contract Participant,” 77  
Fed. Reg. 30,596, 30,600 (May 23, 2012) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 240). 
41. The Volcker Rule aims to ensure that large banks only use swap transactions to hedge or 
intermediate risk, and do not themselves speculate through swap transactions (or other financial 
instruments). Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 619, 12  
U.S.C. § 5301 (2010). 
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C. How Does the Dodd-Frank Act Regulate Swap Markets? 
With the preceding background on the uses of swaps and market structure, we 
turn to the regulation of swaps. Prior to 2010, swap markets were famously 
unregulated.42 Many have argued that the lack of regulation for swap markets 
contributed to the financial crisis and broader economic downturn of 2008.43 The 
Dodd-Frank Act granted the CFTC authority to regulate the vast majority of swaps 
markets, with authority over swaps based on securities44 granted to the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC). Among other things, Title VII of the  
Dodd-Frank Act: (1) imposes central clearing and trade execution requirements on 
swaps;45 (2) provides for the registration and comprehensive regulation of swap 
dealers; and (3) creates rigorous recordkeeping and real-time reporting regimes 
applicable to all swaps.46 These regulations are discussed in turn. 
1. Central Clearing and Platform Execution Under the Dodd-Frank Act. 
When a transaction is cleared, the transaction is extinguished, and two new 
transactions, each identical to the initial transaction, are created. One of the new 
transactions is between the first party to the trade and a clearinghouse (i.e., a central 
counterparty), and the second transaction is between the clearinghouse and the 
second counterparty.47 As a result, parties to a cleared trade pay amounts due under 
the trade to the clearinghouse, rather than to one another.48 Irrespective of whether 
the clearinghouse receives payment due under a cleared trade from one 
counterparty, the clearinghouse must make an identical payment to the other 
counterparty. Thus, the clearinghouse insulates counterparties to the initial trade 
from each other’s default risk.49 Clearinghouses are subject to extensive regulation 
 
42. See Brooksley Born, Deregulation: A Major Cause of the Financial Crisis, 5  
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 231 (2011). Although swaps themselves were generally not regulated, banks, 
bank holding companies, clearinghouses, and other financial institutions that support and use the swaps 
market were subject to significant regulation. In addition, industry associations helped develop 
standardization and best practices in the swaps market. Prior to reforms instituted by the Dodd Frank 
Act, swaps primarily traded in so-called “over-the-counter” or “OTC” markets. Sean J. Griffith, 
Substituted Compliance and Systemic Risk: How to Make a Global Market in Derivatives Regulation, 98 
MINN. L. REV. 1291, 1298 (2014). 
43. See Griffith, supra note 42, at 1304. 
44. The SEC regulates swaps referencing a single security or a narrow basket of securities,  
so-called “security-based swaps”. 
45. Paolo Saguato, The Ownership of Clearinghouses: When “Skin in the Game” Is Not Enough, 
the Remutualization of Clearinghouses, 34 YALE J. REG. 601, 609 (2017) (discussing central clearing, 
platform execution and trade reporting requirements). 
46. Further Definition of “Swap,” “Security-Based Swap,” and “Security-Based Swap 
Agreement”; Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement Recordkeeping, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,208, 
48,209 (Aug. 13, 2012) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 230, 240, 241). 
47. For a description contrasting bilateral trades with cleared trades, see Yesha Yadav, The 
Problematic Case of Clearinghouses in Complex Markets, 101 GEO. L.J. 387, 40913 (2013). 
48. JICKLING & RUANE, supra note 32, at 34. 
49. See Sean J. Griffith, Governing Systemic Risk: Towards A Governance Structure for Derivatives 
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across jurisdictions. Clearinghouses mediate trades subject to a number of operating 
procedures and financial backstops designed to increase the likelihood that 
obligations to the clearinghouse under cleared trades are satisfied.50 Only 
“members” of a clearinghouse may clear trades through it, and members are subject 
to extensive restrictions under clearinghouse and CFTC rules. 
The clearing mandate forms an integral part of the Dodd-Frank Act and 
applies to a range of interest rate and broad-based credit default swaps.51 Certain 
transactions are eligible for exceptions from the clearing mandate. A prominent 
exception from the clearing mandate is made for a non-financial customer that 
enters into a swap to mitigate commercial risk (the so called “end-user exception”).52 
Additional exceptions have been promulgated for inter-affiliate swap transactions 
and certain swaps entered into with cooperatives.53 
Under the Dodd-Frank Act, the clearing mandate dovetails with another 
element of the swaps market reform program.54 As mentioned above, in addition 
to clearing standardized derivatives, Dodd-Frank provides that standardized swaps 
will be traded on exchanges or electronic platforms. In particular, under section 
2(h)(8) of the Commodity Exchange Act, swap transactions that are subject to the 
 
Clearing Houses, 61 EMORY L.J. 1153, 119495 (2012) (“[T]he institution of clearing, if successful, 
effectively eliminates dealers’ counterparty credit risk and, with it, the principal advantage of keeping 
the vast majority of derivatives trading among a small group of (supposedly) high-credit, [sic] quality 
dealers.”). See also Stephen J. Lubben, Always Crashing in the Same Car—Clearinghouse Rescue in the 
United States under Dodd-Frank, 3 J. FIN. REG. 133, 135 (2017) (discussing risks that clearinghouses 
take on in insulating transactions from original counterparty failure). 
50. CFTC regulated clearinghouses, which are called derivatives clearing organizations, must 
satisfy a number of core principles. Commodity Exchange Act § 5b(c)(2), 7 U.S.C. § 7(a)(1)(c)(2). These 
core principles include standards governing the financial resources of the derivatives clearing 
organization, standards governing admission and eligibility of its members, risk management standards, 
standards governing its own default as well as the default of its clearing members and standards 
specifying system safeguards. Id.; see also 17 C.F.R. § 39.1 (2015) (setting forth requirements applicable 
to derivatives clearing organizations); Adam J. Levitin, Response: The Tenuous Case for Derivatives 
Clearinghouses, 101 GEO. L.J. 445, 45456 (2013). 
51. 17 C.F.R. § 50.4 (2015). The CFTC has further considered clearing requirements for certain 
currency non-deliverable forwards. See Silla Brush, U.S. CFTC Clearing Rules Eyed for Some Currency 
Derivatives, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 7, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-10-07/u-
s-clearing-rules-eyed-for-some-currency-derivative-contracts [https://perma.cc/UW36-AXLE] ( last 
visited Nov. 18, 2019); Timothy Massad, Chairman, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, in  
U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, SPEECHES & TESTIMONY, Statement of Chairman 
Timothy Massad on Expanded Interest Rate Swap Clearing Requirement Determination and  
Final Rulemaking (Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/
massadstatement092816 [https://perma.cc/F4QW-Y4JG] ( last visited Nov. 18, 2019). 
52. Commodity Exchange Act § 2(h)(7), 7 U.S.C. § 2 (2018). 
53. Clearing Exemption for Swaps Between Certain Affiliated Entities, 78 Fed. Reg. 21,750, 
21,783 (Apr. 11, 2013) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 50); Clearing Exemption for Certain Swaps Entered 
into by Cooperatives, 78 Fed. Reg. 52,286, 52,287 (Aug. 22, 2013) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 50). 
54. See Guido Ferrarini & Paolo Saguato, Regulating Financial Market Infrastructures, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 568 (Niamh Moloney et al. eds., 2015) (discussing 
the role and regulation of trading and post-trading infrastructures in the securities and derivatives 
market in the United States and in the European Union). 
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clearing mandate must also be executed on a swap execution facility (SEF) or 
designated contract market (DCM) if a SEF or DCM has made the swap “available 
to trade.”55 As background, SEFs and DCMs are trading platforms that must 
register with the CFTC and are regulated by it.56 SEFs and DCMs have made a 
range of interest rate and credit default swaps available to trade.57 As a result, many 
of the swaps that must be cleared must also be executed on a regulated trading 
platform.58 SEFs and DCMs extensively police trading conduct on their platforms.59 
The supervisory and enforcement roles played by regulated platforms enhance trade 
integrity in the many-to-many markets mediated through SEFs and DCMs. Swap 
dealers continue to act as primary liquidity providers to platforms regulated as SEFs 
and DCMs, but as discussed below, liquidity has appreciably moved abroad. 
Prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, swap dealers traded with each other through a 
small number of closed platforms, frequently referred to as “inter-dealer brokers.”60 
It is thought that dealers offered other dealers preferential prices in entering swaps 
through these platforms than they offered to non-dealer customers, reflecting 
wholesale efficiencies or potentially oligopolistic dynamics.61 The Dodd-Frank Act 
attempted to convert these platforms into open access markets to reduce 
opportunities for preferential inter-dealer pricing.62 Generally, transactions that 
must be executed on a SEF or DCM have to go through a period of public order 
 
55. Commodity Exchange Act § 2(h)(8), 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(8) (2012); see Process for a Designated 
Contract Market or Swap Execution Facility to Make a Swap Available to Trade, Swap Transaction 
Compliance and Implementation Schedule, and Trade Execution Requirement Under the Commodity 
Exchange Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 33,606, 33,606 ( June 4, 2013) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 37, 38). 
56. See 17 C.F.R. pt. 37 (2019) (setting forth regulations governing swap execution facilities); id. 
pt. 38 (setting forth regulations governing designated contract markets). 
57. For a list of “made available to trade” swaps that have been submitted, see Swaps Made 
Available to Trade Determination, U.S. CFTC, http://sirt.cftc.gov/sirt/sirt.aspx?Topic=SwapsMade 
AvailableToTradeDetermination [https://perma.cc/7U5C-FZTY] ( last visited Nov. 18, 2019). 
58. Execution of swaps that have been made available to trade on SEFs and DCMs can proceed 
via a request for quote system or through an order book. 17 C.F.R. § 37.9 (2019). A request for quote 
system involves the initiating party identifying three or more potential counterparties to solicit with a 
proposed transaction; the order of the requesting party is exposed to any contra-orders (i.e., potentially 
matching orders) that are sitting in the platform’s order book. Core Principles and Other Requirements 
for Swap Execution Facilities, 78 Fed. Reg. 33,476, 33,494–4501 ( June 4, 2013) (codified at 17  
C.F.R. pt. 37). The order book refers to platform systems maintaining sets of orders and contra-orders 
with price, volume and product information so as to permit automated matching of supply and demand 
for products traded through the platform. 
59. 17 C.F.R. §§ 37.200, 37.203, 37.206, 37.400, 37.500, 38.150, 38.153, 38.156–6159, 38.250, 
38.500, 38.550, 38.600, 38.650, 38.700 (2019). 
60.  J. CHRISTOPHER GIANCARLO & BRUCE TUCKMAN, SWAPS REGULATION VERSION  
2.0—AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT IMPLEMENTATION OF REFORM AND PROPOSALS FOR 
NEXT STEPS 43 (2018). 
61. See Gregory Scopino, Expanding the Reach of the Commodity Exchange Act’s Antitrust 
Considerations, 45 HOFSTRA L. REV. 573 (2016); Andrew Verstein, Benchmark Manipulation, 56  
B.C. L. REV. 215 (2015). See also Marina Lao, Search, Essential Facilities, and the Antitrust Duty to Deal, 
11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 275 (2013); Marina Lao, Networks, Access, and “Essential  
Facilities”: From Terminal Railroad to Microsoft, 62 SMU L. REV. 557 (2009). 
62. See 17 C.F.R. § 37.202(a) (2019). 
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book exposure,63 during which any market participant may improve on an offer 
initially received by the party seeking to trade. The conversion of inter-dealer 
markets into regulated platforms that are open to all qualified traders represents a 
move towards greater egalitarianism in swaps markets.64 The relocation of swap 
dealers discussed further in this Article, however, has subverted the goal of creating 
inclusive markets.65 
2. The Regulation of Swap Dealers Under the Dodd-Frank Act. 
A significant number of trades continue to take place in one-to-many,  
dealer-mediated markets notwithstanding the advent of mandatory clearing and 
platform execution. This is partly because not all products are covered by the 
mandates and partly because of the exceptions from mandate requirements. 
Bespoke and other illiquid instruments may never be covered by the centralized 
clearing requirements because clearinghouses would not have adequate data for 
modeling risk exposure and collecting collateral.66 An even greater set of swap 
transactions is expected to remain outside of the platform execution requirement 
because relatively fewer swaps enjoy liquidity at any point in time (e.g., while there 
may be substantial liquidity in five year floating-for-fixed interest rate swaps, there 
is likely to be little liquidity for the same swap with a term of 3.9 years). The  
end-user exception from the clearing and platform-execution requirements means 
that non-financial end-users will be able to continue entering into uncleared 
transactions directly with dealers of their choice.67 The Dodd-Frank Act imposes a 
range of regulatory obligations that increase financial stability and market integrity 
in these traditional, one-to-many swap markets. 
Several regulations mitigate the credit-risk parties face on swap transactions. 
First, those swap dealers that were not already subject to capital requirements are 
being subjected to capital adequacy standards.68 These capital requirements help 
ensure that swap-dealer counterparties do not default on their swap obligations. 
 
63. See Ilya Beylin, Taxing Fictive Orders: How an Information-Forcing Tax Can Reduce 
Manipulation and Distortion in Financial Product Markets, 85 U. CIN. L. REV. 91, 97–99 (2017) 
(explaining execution of transactions through order books). 
64. Cf. Matthew Leising, Swaps Revolution Falling Flat as Brokers Keep Grip on New Market, 
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Mar. 4, 2014, 4:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-03-05/
swaps-revolution-falling-flat-as-brokers-keep-grip-on-new-market [https://perma.cc/258Y-7W8D] 
( last visited Nov. 18, 2019). Some have criticized this move as neglecting the distinction between swaps 
markets and financial markets for more liquid products, arguing that mandates to provide an 
opportunity for price improvement risk information leakage. See GIANCARLO & TUCKMAN, supra note 
60, at 43–52. 
65. See Kevin S. Haeberle, Discrimination Platforms, 42 J. CORP. L. 809 (2017). 
66. See 17 C.F.R. § 39.5(a)(3)(ii) (2019). 
67. End-User Exception to the Clearing Requirement for Swaps, 77 Fed. Reg. 42,560  
( July 19, 2012). 
68. As of the writing of this Article, the CFTC has yet to finalize the capital requirements 
applicable to swap dealers that are not subject to prudential regulators’ capital standards. See Capital 
Requirements of Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants, 81 Fed. Reg. 91,252 (Dec. 16, 2016). 
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Thus, the capital requirements provide a measure of safety to swap dealers’ 
counterparties. Second, some of swap dealers’ swap transactions that are not cleared 
are subject to “margin” requirements.69 These requirements assure that collateral is 
available to support payment obligations under swaps. 
As collateral securing swaps trade, margin functions to separate the likelihood 
that the posting counterparty will satisfy its obligations from the more complex 
analysis of the posting counterparty’s overall financial health.70 This is because so 
long as the value of collateral is sufficient to satisfy the counterparty’s obligations 
under the trade, the first priority security interest in the collateral guarantees 
payment of the obligations in full.71 Mandatory collateralization increases the 
likelihood that swap market participants collect on obligations owed under swaps.72 
Thereby, the margin rules enhance the financial stability of one-to-many  
dealer-mediated markets. 
In addition to enhancing financial stability of swap markets, regulations 
imposed on swap dealers improve market integrity. The CFTC has mandated that 
swap dealers follow business conduct standards designed to inform end-users of the 
risks they face in entering swap transactions.73 The disclosure regime seeks to reduce 
information asymmetries between swap dealers and their counterparties.74 The rules 
are buttressed by anti-fraud provisions, which expose swap dealers to private 
liability as well as regulatory and criminal sanction. 
Disclosure requirements under the rules are extensive. Swap dealers are 
required to prepare disclosures for their counterparties that explain material 
information concerning the swap to allow the counterparty to assess: (1) the material 
risks of the swap, which may include market, credit, liquidity, foreign currency, legal, 
 
69.  Margin requirements initially proposed under Title VII were substantially relaxed through 
an international harmonization process led by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions. Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for 
Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants, 76 Fed. Reg. 23,732 (April 28, 2011) (initial proposal); 
Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants, 79  
Fed. Reg. 59,898 (Oct. 3, 2014) (modified proposal following BCBS and IOSCO recommendations); 
Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants, 81  
Fed. Reg. 636 ( Jan. 6, 2016) (final rules). 
70. In addition to being a source of collateral for obligations ex post, the obligation to post 
margin provides an ex ante constraint on a party’s ability to take risky positions. See Margin Requirements 
for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants, 79 Fed. Reg. at 59,901  
(“Well-designed margin systems protect both parties to a trade as well as the overall financial system. 
They serve both as a check on risk-taking that might exceed a party’s financial capacity and as a resource 
that can limit losses when there is a failure by a party to meet its obligations.”). 
71. See generally LINDA J. RUSCH & STEPHEN L. SEPINUCK, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON 
SECURED TRANSACTIONS 59–64 (3d ed. 2014). 
72. Norman Menachem Feder, Deconstructing Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 2002  
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 677, 723–24 (2002). 
73. Gregory A. Scopino, Regulating Fairness: The Dodd Frank Act’s Fair Dealing Requirement 
for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants, 93 NEB.  L. REV. 31 (2014). 
74. Business Conduct Standards for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants with 
Counterparties, 77 Fed. Reg. 9734, 9743 n.125 (Feb. 17, 2012). 
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operational, and any other applicable risks; (2) the material characteristics of the 
particular swap, which include the material economic terms of the swap, the terms 
relating to the operation of the swap, and the rights and obligations of the parties 
during the term of the swap; and (3) the material incentives and conflicts of interest 
that the swap dealer or major swap participant may have in connection with a 
particular swap.75 At the election of end-user counterparties, swap dealers are also 
required to prepare a scenario analysis that shows the end-user’s potential exposure 
in connection with the swap.76 The external business conduct rules governing swap 
dealers permit end-users to consult on the development of scenario analysis, thus 
tailoring it to their needs.77 In addition, to help end-users value their swap positions, 
the rules require swap dealers to provide end-user counterparties with a daily  
mid-market mark of the swap.78 Where the swap is cleared, the swap dealer may 
instead provide the end-user with notice that the end-user is entitled to obtain the 
mid-market mark from the clearinghouse where the swap was cleared.79 
A variety of protections are afforded to end-users obtaining swaps from swap 
dealers. Swap dealers are prohibited from engaging in any act, practice, or course of 
business that is fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative. The prohibition broadly 
tracks the language in Section 206(4) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 
(Advisers Act), which does not require scienter to prove liability.80 Swap dealers are 
 
75. 17 C.F.R. § 23.431(a) (2019). 
76. Id. § 23.431(b). 
77. Id. § 23.431(b)(1). 
78. Id. § 23.431(d). 
79. In addition to disclosure obligations, swap dealers are subject to record-collecting 
requirements. Among other things, swap dealers are required to gather certain information from 
counterparties, including their true name and address and principal occupation or business.  
Id. § 23.402(c) (2019). Additional information must be gathered about any person guaranteeing the 
counterparty’s performance and any person controlling the counterparty. Id. Swap dealers are required 
to maintain extensive records of their swap activities. This requirement goes well past information 
relating the terms of the trade. It includes all oral and written communications concerning quotes, bids, 
and other features of the trade that are made during the solicitation and negotiation phases of the 
transaction preceding execution. Id. § 23.202(a)(1) (2019). The terms of the transaction must naturally 
be recorded. Id. § 23.202(a)(2). Records of post-trade processing and events must also be maintained. 
Id. § 23.202(a)(3). Not only is the scope of information covered by recordkeeping requirements broad, 
but the rules anticipate a level of technological sophistication in accessing the information. Records 
must be searchable by transaction or counterparty. And where trade negotiations take place orally, the 
phone calls must be recorded and annotated to among other things, identify the timing of any 
quotations given on the call. Trade-related records that must be kept also include (i) daily valuations of 
each swap; (ii) daily current and potential future exposure of each counterparty; (iii) daily initial and 
variation margin required; (iv) daily valuations of collateral, with and without haircuts; and (v) a variety 
of other swap related information. Id. § 23.202(a). Additionally, swap dealers must maintain detailed 
records of cash and forward positions related to swaps. Id. § 23.202(b). 
80. See SEC v. Steadman, 967 F.2d 636, 647 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“[S]ection 206(4) uses the more 
neutral ‘act, practice, or course or business’ language. This is similar to [Securities Act] section 17(a)(3)’s 
‘transaction, practice, or course of business,’ which ‘quite plainly focuses upon the effect of particular 
conduct . . . rather than upon the culpability of the person responsible.’ Accordingly, scienter is not 
required under section 206(4), and the SEC did not have to prove it in order to establish the appellants’ 
liability.’’) (internal citations omitted). 
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also required to communicate with their counterparties “in a fair and balanced 
manner based on principles of fair dealing and good faith.”81 Swap dealers that 
recommend a swap or trading strategy involving swaps to an end-user must  
(1) undertake reasonable diligence to understand the potential risks and rewards 
associated with the recommendation; and (2) have a reasonable basis to believe that 
the recommended swap or trading strategy involving a swap is suitable for the 
counterparty.82 Additional protections apply to swap dealers’ counterparties that 
qualify as “special entities.”83 For these purposes, “special entities” are defined to 
include a variety of federal and state bodies, certain employee benefit plans and 
endowments.84 In aggregate, the combination of regulatory requirements has 
profoundly reshaped U.S. swap markets.85 
 
81. 17 C.F.R. § 23.433 (2019). 
82. 17 C.F.R. § 23.434(a) (2019) (recommendations to counterparties). 
83. 17 C.F.R. § 23.410 (2019) (general prohibitions on fraud, manipulation and other abusive 
practices); § 23.440 (2019) (requirements for swap dealers acting as advisors to special entities); § 23.450 
(2019) (requirements for swap dealers acting as counterparties to special entities); § 23.451(2019) 
(certain pay-to-play prohibitions). 
84. 17 C.F.R. § 23.401(c) (2019). 
85. Daniel Awrey, in writing about the reforms, has criticized the intervention for applying the 
securities model of regulation to derivatives. Daniel Awrey, Split Derivatives: Inside the World’s Most 
Misunderstood Contract, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 495, 557 (2019) [hereinafter Split Derivatives] (“In the years 
leading up to the global financial crisis, derivatives were largely exempt from the application of federal 
securities laws. This laissez-faire regulatory treatment arguably reflected the prevailing political climate 
more than any consensus around whether derivatives should be regulated as securities. In the wake of 
the crisis, however, policymakers in the United States and elsewhere have been quick to extend the 
reach of securities laws to derivatives markets. As described in Part I.C, this has included the 
introduction of trade reporting and disclosure requirements broadly similar to those imposed on 
conventional equity and debt securities.”). Split Derivatives draws a distinction between derivatives and 
securities based on the heterogeneity of the former and contractual incompleteness and relational 
contract mechanisms “distinguish[ing] derivatives from conventional equity and debt securities.” Id. at 
554–55. Split Derivatives proceeds to criticize Dodd-Frank Act regulation for failing to adequately apply 
prudential safeguards. Id. at 555–60. These criticisms misperceive the function of derivatives and the 
scope of swap regulation following the Dodd-Frank Act. 
  Derivatives like debt and, even more so, equity contracts can and do suffer from incompleteness 
and rely on relational mechanisms. Voting rights, fiduciary obligations, and other protections afforded 
to many shareholders as well as managerial reputation serve as important examples of extra-contractual 
mechanisms protecting equity holders from exploitation of incompleteness. This is especially true in 
non-listed equity markets. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from 
the American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1085 (2003). Moreover, derivatives markets include 
futures and exchange traded options, which are homogenous. Instead, the key difference between 
conventional securities like bonds and equity on the one hand, and derivatives, on the other hand, is 
their function. Bonds and equity help issuers raise capital so, for example, new companies can begin 
operations and older companies can finance projects or pay returns to their investors. Derivatives, in 
contrast, are generally not used to obtain capital but rather to manage exposure to risks. See supra Part 
I.B. Of course, there are exceptions such as options granted to employees that reduce issuers need for 
capital—but the general distinction between securities and derivatives holds and informs the split in 
jurisdiction between the SEC and CFTC. 
 Because capital formation is a key interest weighed in the SEC’s rules governing securities, Split 
Derivatives correctly identifies that these rules may not be well tailored to swaps. But in criticizing the 
expansion of securities laws to govern swaps, Split Derivatives overlooks that the great majority of swaps 
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3. The Costs of Dodd-Frank Act Swaps Regulations. 
As discussed above, the Dodd-Frank Act fundamentally reshapes swap 
markets. The costs of these changes have been significant. As a sample, swap 
dealers are estimated to now commit over $1.4 trillion in margin for cleared and 
uncleared trades.86 This figure reflects mandatory purchases of liquid, high-grade 
 
are (for this reason, among others) not regulated as securities. See supra note 44 and surrounding text. 
Furthermore, well over eight years after the Dodd-Frank Act was enacted, the SEC has not yet 
implemented most regulations treating the fraction of swaps within its purview as securities. See  
Security-Based Swap Rules Back on Track: SEC Reopens Comment Period for Proposals, SIDLEY AUSTIN 
LLP (Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.sidley.com/en/insights/newsupdates/2018/10/back-on-track-
securities-and-exchange-commission-reopens-comment-period-for-key [https://perma.cc/K6WT-
X442] ( last visited Nov. 18, 2019). Those disclosure requirements that are imposed on swap markets 
differ markedly from the prospectus and periodic disclosure-based regimes conventionally applied to 
securities markets. Compare Split Derivatives, supra at 556 (explaining that “[f]ederal securities  
laws . . . [impose] ‘prospectus, event-driven, and continuous disclosure requirements on issuers of 
securities.’), with id. at 556 n.79, and surrounding text (explaining Dodd-Frank Act disclosure 
requirements that are generally unrelated to the financial state of the swap dealer “issuing” the swap). 
The new rules governing swaps do not require dealers to provide extensive disclosure on their financial 
state and operations at the time of execution or subsequently. The foregoing is not to suggest that when 
the SEC completes its rulemakings governing security-based swaps, there will not be important impacts 
on some markets such as single-name CDS or total return swaps on equities.  
 Split Derivatives also mischaracterizes other Dodd-Frank Act regulations of swap markets. 
Among other things, Split Derivatives criticizes the new rules for failing to sufficiently address 
prudential concerns. But the criticism proceeds without assessing significant prudential regulations 
embedded in Title VII, such capital and margin requirements that reduce credit risk on swap 
transactions. Split Derivatives also casts doubt on the SEC’s capacity to implement prudential oversight, 
without addressing the history of SEC’s regulation of broker-dealers (instead, focusing on the failed 
supervision of “Consolidated Supervised Entities”). Id. at 559. In criticizing the adequacy of prudential 
regulation under Title VII, that paper also fails to appreciate the substantial role of banking regulators 
in designing capital and margin standards. Compare id. at 559–60 (calling into question the SEC’s and 
CFTC’s capacities to achieve prudential policy goals), with Final Rule to Establish Margin and Capital 
Requirements for Covered Swap Entities 4–45 (October 10, 2018), https://www.federalregister.gov/
documents/2018/10/10/2018-22021/margin-and-capital-requirements-for-covered-swap-entities-
final-rule [https://perma.cc/H6S6-B4ZQ] ( last visited Nov. 18, 2019) (“For swap entities that are 
prudentially regulated by one of the [banking regulators], sections 731 and 764 of the Dodd-Frank Act 
require the [banking agencies] to adopt rules . . . imposing (i) capital requirements, and (ii) initial and 
variation margin requirements on [uncleared] swaps”). Inevitably, academic work must simplify and 
focus selectively, yet even at a high level, the critique of regulation that Split Derivatives offers disregards 
substantial features of Title VII and the markets it regulates. 
86. Hayley McDowell, Over $1.4 Trillion in Collateral Posted by Top Swaps Dealers,  
GLOBAL CUSTODIAN  (Sept.  18,  2017),  https://www.lch.com/sites/default/files/media/files/
Best%20Practices%20in%20CCP%20Risk%20Management_3.pdf?utm_source=Global%20Custodia
n&utm_medium=Billboard&utm_term=ROS&utm_content=Risk%20Whitepaper&utm_campaign=
Risk%20Whitepaper [https://perma.cc/X7VJ-LHJ9] ( last visited Nov. 18, 2019); see BASEL COMM. 
ON BANKING SUPERVISION & BD. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMMS., MARGIN REQUIREMENTS 
FOR NON-CENTRALLY CLEARED DERIVATIVES (Feb. 2013) (expecting market participants to need an 
additional €700 billion in liquid collateral to meet new margin requirements); BASEL COMM. ON 
BANKING SUPERVISION & BD. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMMS., MARGIN REQUIREMENTS FOR 
NON-CENTRALLY CLEARED DERIVATIVES 2 (Sept. 2013) (explaining that clearing imposes costs in 
part due to related margin requirements and that the margin requirements imposed on uncleared 
transactions have to be even costlier to drive transactions towards clearing). 
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assets that have lower returns than alternative investments swap dealers may make.87 
Including service costs charged by clearinghouses and their members for clearing a 
swap, the costs of a one trillion U.S. dollar interest rate swap position with a  
ten-year duration held for two years is over four hundred million U.S. dollars.88 
Annual costs of clearing for a market exceeding a hundred trillion in notional 
amount to tens of billions of dollars.89 Because these amounts represent the costs 
of risk management, which would occur in an unregulated world to some extent, 
the measure is an over-estimate of costs. But mandatory clearing certainly comes 
with costs, and the costs of entering into uncleared swaps are by regulator design 
even higher. In addition, the potential for end-user participation in dealer-to-dealer 
markets through SEFs and DCMs risks compromising any profits swap dealers 
receive through preferential wholesale rates in the dealer-to-dealer market. 
Although collateral costs and erosion of oligopolistic pricing may represent the 
greatest private costs motivating relocation, direct compliance costs are also present. 
For the fifteen largest swap dealers in the U.S., the costs of building compliance 
technology were estimated at approximately $5 billion.90 Lawyers, compliance 
professionals, and back-office enhancements represent additional costs. 
 
4. The Cross-border Reach of Swaps Regulations. 
The cross-border reach of these new regulations was substantially uncertain 
until July of 2013. In July of 2013, the CFTC issued interpretive guidance explaining 
conditions under which regulatory obligations would attach to transactions 
completed partly or wholly outside of the United States.91 A seventy-five day 
transition period delayed the onset of that guidance, so international swap market 
participants had until early to mid-October 2013 to conform to the guidance.92 
Major trade groups representing the financial industry mounted a challenge to the 
cross-border guidance, which they lost in September 2014.93 While the challenge 
 
87. ANDREW AWAD & KEVIN MCPARTLAND, GREENWICH ASSOCIATES, TOTAL COST 
ANALYSIS  INTEREST-RATE SWAPS VS. FUTURES 13 (Mar. 9, 2015), https://www.greenwich.com/
fixed-income-fx-cmds/total-cost-analysis-interest-rate-swaps-vs-futures [https://perma.cc/5P39-
P56M] ( last visited Nov. 18, 2019). 
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
90. CAPGEMENI, IMPACT OF TITLE VII OF THE DODD FRANK ACT 15 (2011). The annual cost 
of swap regulation in the European Union was estimated at €15.5 billion. DELOITTE, OTC 
DERIVATIVES: THE NEW COST OF TRADING 1 (2014). 
91. Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance with Certain Swap 
Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. 45,292 ( July 26, 2013) [hereinafter “Cross-Border Guidance”]. 
92. Exemptive Order Regarding Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations, 78  
Fed. Reg. 43,785, 43,793–95 ( July 22, 2013). 
93. SIFMA v. CFTC, 67 F. Supp. 3d at 422–23 (holding the cross-border guidance was a  
non-binding policy statement but recognizing that industry participants would nevertheless “see the 
writing on the wall” and comply with the guidance to avoid enforcement risk). 
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was being heard, swap dealers incurred significant costs in conforming their 
international operations to the dictates of Title VII.94 
Section 2(i) of the Commodity Exchange Act limits the applicability of swap 
regulations under Title VII to “those activities [that] have a direct and significant 
connection with activities in, or effect on, commerce of the United States.”95 A 
highly politicized process led to the translation of this vague standard into a more 
definitive set of rules for market participants to use in determining whether the new 
swap regulations apply to their activities.96 In what was criticized as governmental 
evasion, the CFTC chose not to use a notice-and-comment process or undertake 
cost-benefit analysis in publishing what was termed its cross-border guidance 
(alternately known as extraterritorial guidance, by its critics).97 The cross-border 
guidance explains who qualifies as a “U.S. person” and the applicability of swap 
regulations to U.S. person swap-dealers, non-U.S. person swap-dealers, and 
others.98 
The applicability of swap regulations is generally determined on an entity 
level.99 An entity either is or is not a “U.S. person,” and the applicability of swap 
 
94. Id. at 423, 435. 
95. This section also permits the CFTC to promulgate rules preventing the evasion of swap 
regulations. See Stephen Kim Park, Targeted Social Transparency as Global Corporate Strategy, 35  
NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 87, 105 (2014) (“Dodd Frank Act applies extraterritorial regulation in a range 
of areas.”). 
96.  Krug, infra note 122, at 1596–698; Schan Duff, The New Financial Stability Regulation, 23 
STAN J.L. BUS. & FIN. 46, 98 (2018) (discussing harmonization of Title VII swap regulation and the 
impression that the harmonization process was “viewed as adversarial, and very much not in the spirit 
of other international financial regulatory bodies”); SIFMA v. CFTC, 67 F. Supp. 3d at 420 (“Plaintiffs 
counter that the Cross-Border Action’s text and the CFTC’s characterization of the action are a carefully 
orchestrated charade intended to insulate the Cross-Border Action from judicial review.”). 
97. Krug, infra note 122, at 1598–99 (explaining how the CFTC avoided typical rulemaking 
procedures in adopting its cross-border guidance); Ross Pazzol & Adam J. Joines, D.C. Judge Rules in 
Favor of CFTC on Cross-Border Application of Dodd Frank Rules, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 25, 2014) 
available online at https://www.bloomberg.com/professional/blog/d-c-judge-rules-in-favor-of-cftc-
on-cross-border-application-of-Dodd Frank-rules/ [https://perma.cc/HL3D-8A3T] ( last visited on 
July 30, 2018). 
98. See Cross-Border Guidance, supra note 91. 
99. The definition of U.S. person includes “(i) any natural person who is a resident of the United 
States; (ii) any estate of a decedent who was a resident of the United States at the time of death; (iii) any 
corporation, partnership, limited liability company, business or other trust, association, joint-stock 
company, fund or any form of enterprise similar to any of the foregoing (other than an entity described 
in prongs (iv) or (v), below) (a “legal entity”), in each case that is organized or incorporated under the 
laws of a state or other jurisdiction in the United States or having its principal place of business in the 
United States; (iv) any pension plan for the employees, officers or principals of a legal entity described 
in prong (iii), unless the pension plan is primarily for foreign employees of such entity; (v) any trust 
governed by the laws of a state or other jurisdiction in the United States, if a court within the United 
States is able to exercise primary supervision over the administration of the trust; (vi) any commodity 
pool, pooled account, investment fund, or other collective investment vehicle that is not described in 
prong (iii) and that is majority-owned by one or more persons described in prong (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), or 
(v), except any commodity pool, pooled account, investment fund, or other collective investment 
vehicle that is publicly offered only to non-U.S. persons and not offered to U.S. persons [sic]; (vii) any 
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regulations turns on the involvement of U.S. persons in the relevant activity. 
Critically, the definition of U.S. person does not capture subsidiaries of a  
U.S. person, even wholly-owned subsidiaries.100 Thus even if a U.S. bank wholly 
owns and controls an entity, that subsidiary will be a non-U.S. person if it has its 
principal place of business and is organized abroad.101 
The entity-level approach prompts difficult line-drawing problems for 
applying U.S. regulation to activity between an entity and a  
non-U.S. counterparty.102 At one end of the spectrum, a U.S. bank swap dealer 
originates, negotiates, executes, and administers a swap from its headquarters or 
other U.S. office. At the other end of the spectrum, a U.S. bank organizes a foreign 
subsidiary and ensures that all personnel and assets involved in the origination, 
 
legal entity (other than a limited liability company, limited liability partnership or similar entity where 
all of the owners of the entity have limited liability) that is directly or indirectly majority-owned by one 
or more persons described in prong (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), or (v) and in which such person(s) bears unlimited 
responsibility for the obligations and liabilities of the legal entity; and (viii) any individual account or 
joint account (discretionary or not) where the beneficial owner (or one of the beneficial owners in the 
case of a joint account) is a person described in prong (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), or (vii). Cross-Border 
Guidance, supra note 91, at 45,316–617. Technically, the definition of U.S. person in the CFTC 
guidance is non-exclusive meaning that other entities may qualify as U.S. person notwithstanding that 
they do not meet any of the specified criteria. In practice, however, industry participants have relied on 
the specified U.S. person definition in the guidance lacking any firmer delineation of who may be a 
U.S. person. The CFTC has suggested that a person “seek[ing] guidance as to whether it is a U.S. person 
for purposes of applying the Commission swaps regulations promulgated under Title VII” may seek 
written advice or guidance from the CFTC under regulation 140.99. Id. at 45,316 n.235. It is 
questionable, however, whether it is practicable for industry participants to seek guidance confirming 
that every entity that does not meet one of the specified criteria is indeed a non-U.S. person. Subsequent 
CFTC rules under Title VII have incorporated the entity based approach, and although the definition 
of U.S. person has varied, these variations do not affect the analysis in this Article. See Margin 
Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants—Cross-Border 
Application of the Margin Requirements, 81 Fed. Reg. 34818, 34823 (May 31, 2016) (“The status of a 
legal entity as a U.S. person would not generally affect whether a separately incorporated or organized 
legal entity in the affiliated corporate group is a U.S. person. Therefore, an affiliate or a subsidiary of a 
U.S. person that is organized or incorporated in a non-U.S. jurisdiction would not be deemed a  
U.S. person solely by virtue of being affiliated with a U.S. person.”). 
100. See SIFMA v. CFTC, 67 F. Supp. 3d, at 422–23. Investment funds are categorized as  
U.S. persons based on the identity of the majority of their owners under prong (vi) of the U.S. person 
definition. This does not affect the analysis because the swap dealers whose drop in swap notionals 
motivates this paper are large banks rather than investment funds. Similarly, entities with a majority of 
beneficial owners that are U.S. persons with unlimited liability for the entity (such as partnerships with 
U.S. based general partners) are U.S. persons under prong (vii). But this too is irrelevant to the analysis 
of this paper because as a practical matter, unlimited liability entities are rarely if ever used by banks to 
organize their operations. 
101. See id. 
102. The intent here is not to criticize the entity based approach, although principled challenges 
to that approach are explored below. There is no reason to think that another basis for defining the 
reach of Title VII regulations would not have also posed difficult line drawing problems. If anything, 
the CFTC’s approach reserved opportunity to re-characterize seemingly non-U.S. persons as  
U.S. persons compromising clarity and predictability for the benefit of avoiding regulatory arbitrage 
that takes advantage of line-drawing. See id.; Alex Raskolnikov, Probabilistic Compliance, 34 YALE J. ON  
REG. 491 (2017). 
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negotiation, execution, and administration of the swap are resident in a foreign 
jurisdiction. Infinite grays exist between these two poles. A major question arises as 
to whether and how to regulate a swap with a foreign entity when it is originated, 
negotiated, executed, or administered by a U.S. bank swap dealer from facilities 
outside of the United States.103 This question was answered by the CFTC in 
providing limited relief to non-U.S. branches of U.S. banks transacting with foreign 
persons.104 However, the relief was limited and created an enormous distinction 
between the applicability of swap regulations to a foreign subsidiary and a foreign 
branch in the context of trading with non-U.S. persons. If a U.S. bank operates  
non-U.S. facing swap activities from a non-U.S. branch,105 those activities are 
subject to a far wider range of regulations than if the bank segregates them in a 
foreign subsidiary.106 Among other requirements, a U.S. bank swap dealer must 
 
103. In a working paper, Michael Greenberger claims that due to banks taking advantage of an 
“obscure footnote” in CFTC guidance, swap dealers were able to sidestep swap regulations while 
“arranging, negotiating, and executing” swaps in the United States with U.S. bank personnel. This claim 
as to the reach of swap regulation is inaccurate and was unfortunately disseminated through media 
reports. Jim Zarroli, Big Banks are Once Again Taking Risks with Complex Financial Trades, Report Says ( June 
19, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/06/19/621543525/big-banks-are-once-again-taking-risks-
with-complex-financial-trades-report-says [https://perma.cc/X3QY-TZWT] (last visited Nov. 18, 
2019); see also Claire Boston, Swap Loophole Leaves U.S. Taxpayers on Hook for Trades, BLOOMBERG  
(June 19, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-19/swap-loophole-leaves-u-s-
taxpayers-on-hook-for-trades-report [https://perma.cc/YDC8-YW53] .  
104. As background, international branches of banks have a complicated legal status. The CFTC 
has explained that a foreign branch of a U.S. person is itself a U.S. person. Cross-Border Guidance, 
supra note 91, at 45,315. In the CFTC’s view, a branch does not have a legal identity separate from that 
of its principal entity. Id.  The CFTC has also observed that branches are neither separately incorporated 
nor separately capitalized and, more generally, the rights and obligations of a branch are the rights and 
obligations of its principal entity (and vice versa). Id. Leading private practice lawyers in financial 
regulation have disagreed with the CFTC’s characterization of bank branches. HLS Forum on Corp. 
Governance and Fin. Regulation, Separate Entity Doctrine for U.S. Branches of Foreign Banks,  
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOV. & FIN. REG. (April 30, 2012). In particular, law firms have pointed 
out the segregation of branch assets from other bank assets during insolvency to support the  
quasi-entity status of branches. Id. 
105. For purposes of CFTC guidance, a “foreign branch” is a branch of a U.S. bank that is: (i) 
subject to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC’s) Regulation K or the FDIC 
International Banking Regulation, or otherwise designated as a “foreign branch” by the U.S. bank’s 
primary regulator, (ii) maintains accounts independently of the home office and of the accounts of 
other foreign branches with the profit or loss accrued at each branch determined as a separate item for 
each foreign branch, and (iii) subject to substantive regulation in banking or financing in the jurisdiction 
where it is located. Cross-Border Guidance, supra note 91, at 45,329. 
106. CFTC Guidance provides that a swap will be viewed as entered into with a  
non-U.S. branch of a U.S. bank rather than the U.S. bank if: (i) the employees negotiating and agreeing 
to the terms of the swap (or, if the swap is executed electronically, managing the execution of the swap), 
other than employees with functions that are solely clerical or ministerial, are located in such foreign 
branch or in another foreign branch of the U.S. bank; (ii) the foreign branch or another foreign branch 
is the office through which the U.S. bank makes and receives payments and deliveries under the swap 
on behalf of the foreign branch pursuant to a master netting or similar trading agreement, and the 
documentation of the swap specifies that the office for the U.S. bank is such foreign branch; (iii) the 
swap is entered into by such foreign branch in its normal course of business; (iv) the swap is treated as 
a swap of the foreign branch for tax purposes; and (v) the swap is reflected in the local accounts of the 
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meet the following Title VII obligations when trading with a non-U.S. party even if 
that trading is conducted out of a non-U.S. branch (none of which would apply if 
that trading was done out of a non-U.S. subsidiary): 
x Clearing; 
x Platform execution; 
x Margin requirements for uncleared swaps; 
x Swap data recordkeeping; 
x Swap reporting (including large swap trader reporting and real-time 
reporting of swap transaction data); 
x Portfolio reconciliation and compression; and 
x Trade confirmation.107 
Several of these substantial requirements are eligible for “substituted 
compliance” if the trade is entered into from a foreign branch of the U.S. swap 
dealer. This relief, however, addresses inconsistency between U.S. and foreign 
regulations rather than the burden of those regulations.108 For Title VII regulations 
to be satisfied through “substituted compliance,” the CFTC must find that 
applicable non-U.S. regulations are “comparable with and as comprehensive as the 
corollary area(s) of [Title VII] regulatory obligations.”109 In other words, a foreign 
branch of a U.S. bank swap dealer may satisfy a Title VII obligation through 
complying with foreign law only if the foreign law accomplishes the same regulatory 
objectives as the relevant Title VII regulation.110 Foreign branches of U.S. bank 
swap dealers are not given relief from the “what” of any Title VII regulations, they 
are only given flexibility as to “how” those obligations are satisfied.111 
The gap in regulatory treatment of U.S. bank swap dealers and their foreign 
subsidiaries creates a powerful incentive for moving swap activity from U.S. swap 
dealers into foreign subsidiaries.112 Part I above explained the significant costs 
 
foreign branch. Id. at 45,330. 
107. Id. at 45,368–69. 
108. Some of the most thorough and seminal treatments of inter-jurisdictional regulatory 
consistency and its effects for regulatory arbitrage and competitiveness come from the tax literature. 
To analogize to tax scholarship, substituted compliance grants U.S. businesses a credit for compliance 
with foreign regulation that can be used to offset the regulatory obligations of U.S. regulation. See Daniel 
Shaviro, The Case Against Foreign Tax Credits, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 65, 66 (2011) (describing a worldwide 
system of U.S. taxation that eliminates double taxation through giving offsetting credit for taxes paid 
to foreign jurisdictions as a common model for effective tax administration, and criticizing that model). 
109. Cross-Border Guidance, supra note 91, at 45,342. 
110. Id. 
111. The CFTC has made determinations that certain Title VII requirements may be met 
through compliance with foreign regulations after detailed examination of those foreign requirements 
and findings that they achieve the same regulatory objectives as the relevant Title VII requirements.  
See Comparability Determinations for Substituted Compliance Purposes, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES 
TRADING COMM’N, https://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/DoddFrankAct/CDSCP/index.htm 
[https://perma.cc/L75J-H236] ( last visited Nov. 11, 2019). 
112. The Dodd Frank Act recognizes the potential race-to-the-bottom in regulatory laxity. To 
deter jurisdictions from adapting permissive regimes and to protect the U.S. financial system from those 
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compliance with swap regulation poses to swap dealers. And there is ample 
anecdotal evidence that industry participants sought to cabin the reach of Title VII 
to U.S. shores.113 Previous literature has proposed regulatory arbitrage may lead 
firms to relocate activity to minimize regulatory burdens.114 The imposition of Title 
VII regulations and comprehensive data on swap market activity reviewed in this 
Article provides an opportunity to examine whether regulatory arbitrage in  
fact occurs. 
II. REGULATORY CHANGES AND THE REDUCTION OF SWAP NOTIONALS 
Figure I.A above shows the trend motivating this Article. Since late 2013, 
outstanding interest rate swap notional amounts in the United States have declined 
by over a third. Although difficult to measure, the value of the interest rate swap 
market as of the end of 2017 has been estimated to approach fifteen trillion U.S. 
dollars.115 Economists believe the size of the interest rate swap market is 
comparable to the size of the U.S. Treasuries market (16 trillion USD), corporate 
bond market (12 trillion USD), mortgage market (15 trillion USD), and municipal 
securities market (4 trillion USD).116 The apparent scale of the reduction in swap 
market activity is staggering. How would one comprehend, for example, the 
consequences for everyday American life of a sustained decrease in home financing 
 
jurisdictions, the Dodd Frank Act includes a provision permitting the CFTC or the SEC, in consultation 
with the Treasury, to “determine[ ] that the regulation of swaps or security-based swaps markets in a 
foreign country undermines the stability of the United States financial system . . . [and to] prohibit an 
entity domiciled in the foreign country from participating in the United States in any swap or  
security-based swap activities.” Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,  
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1871 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 87o), § 715. 
113. See SIFMA v. CFTC, 67 F. Supp. 3d at 396–697. 
114. Coffee, supra note 3, at 1278 (referring to burdens from swap regulation as substantial); 
Further Definition of “Swap Dealer,” “Security-Based Swap Dealer,” “Major Swap Participant,” 
“Major Security-Based Swap Participant” and “Eligible Contract Participant”, 77 Fed. Reg. 30,596, 
30,703 (May 23, 2012) (“For entities that are not on the boundaries of the statutory definitions, but 
rather squarely within them or entirely outside of them, these rules will not affect the costs and benefits 
that result from their inclusion or exclusion. The latter group of costs and benefits are a consequence 
of the statutory definitions prescribed by Congress.”). On the difficulties and potential misuse of 
quantifying the costs (and benefits) of financial regulation, see John C. Coates IV, The Volcker Rule as 
Structural Law: Implications for Cost-Benefit Analysis and Administrative Law, 10 CAP. MKTS. L. J. 447 
(2015); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Empty Call for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Financial Regulation, 43 J. LEGAL 
STUD. S351 (2014). See also Urska Velikonja, Reporting Agency Performance: Behind the SEC’s 
Enforcement Statistics, 10 CORNELL L. REV. 901 (2016) (examining inadequacies in SEC reporting of 
enforcement results). 
115. Rob Daly, CFTC Looks to ‘Right-Size’ Swaps Market, MARKETS MEDIA (Feb. 1, 2018), 
https://www.marketsmedia.com/cftc-right-size-swaps-market/ [https://perma.cc/JE64-GL2B] 
( last visited Nov. 18, 2019). 
RICHARD HAYNES, JOHN ROBERTS, RAJIV SHARMA & BRUCE TUCKMAN, INTRODUCING ENNS: A 
MEASURE OF THE SIZE OF INTEREST RATE SWAP MARKETS (Jan. 2018), http://www.cftc.gov/
idc/groups/public/@economicanalysis/documents/file/oce_enns0118.pdf [https://perma.cc/G6 
38-PTAE]. ( last visited Nov. 18, 2019). 
116.  HAYNES ET AL., supra note 115.  
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of over thirty-three percent? If the drop in U.S. swap market activity represents a 
real economic reduction in swap volumes, a new financial era has invisibly 
dawned.117 Figure I.A suggests that corporate risk management policies have 
fundamentally changed over the last decade. Is this so? And what could have 
prompted the apparent depression in U.S. swap markets? The rest of this Part 
explores the impact of swaps regulation on U.S. swaps activity and explains the 
decline of swaps activity as a migration of swaps activity from the United States. 
It is common to attribute declines in market activity to regulatory burdens.118 
The most important and potentially dis-locative swaps regulations under Title VII 
of the Dodd-Frank Act took effect at the end of 2012 and throughout 2013.119 
Appendix A provides a timeline of when major swaps regulations took effect. Did 
the initiation of a comprehensive regulatory regime over the swap market cause a 
massive decrease in activity? More broadly, did the new regulations cause an 
appreciable impact on the U.S. economy? 
Data from several sources is inconsistent with the view that Title VII 
materially altered the U.S. economy.120 As explained above, swap dealers 
intermediate transactions between customers (i.e. “end-users”) that enter into swaps 
to hedge risk or speculate on future movements in asset prices.121 Commonly, risk 
from a transaction with an end-user is mediated through a chain of multiple swap 
 
117.  This Article focuses on Title VII, but there may be other regulations under the  
Dodd-Frank Act impacting swaps markets such as changes in bank capital rules and other constraints 
on leverage affecting dealers. For an exploration of how independent sets of regulations may serve as 
complements or substitutes, see Matthew C. Turk, Overlapping Legal Rules in Financial Regulation and 
the Administrative State, 54 GA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019). 
118. See, e.g., Hester Peirce, Dwindling Numbers in the Financial Industry, BROOKINGS (May 15, 
2017), https://www.brookings.edu/research/dwindling-numbers-in-the-financial-industry/ [https://
perma.cc/73WS-SATG] ( last visited July 30, 2018); J. Christopher Giancarlo, Acting Chairman, 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC: A New Direction Forward (Mar. 15, 2017) (explaining 
the goals of project “Keep It Simple Stupid (KISS)” as reducing “excessive regulatory 
burdens”), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opagiancarlo-20 [https://
perma.cc/7NE9-JENB] ( last visited July 30, 2018); Daniel Awrey, The Mechanisms of Derivatives 
Market Efficiency, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1104, 1173 (2016); Torsten Ehlers & Egemen Eren, The Changing 
Shape of Interest Rate Derivatives Markets, BIS QUARTERLY REVIEW (Dec. 2016), https://
www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1612f.htm [https://perma.cc/U8UL-RRXH] ( last visited July 10, 
2018) (attributing changes in interest rate markets to regulation and monetary policy); ISDA Research 
Note, Cross-Border Fragmentation of Global Derivatives: End-Year 2014 Update, ISDA, Apr. 2015, 
https://www.isda.org/a/nqiDE/market-fragmentation-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/SAW5-UZE7] 
( last visited July 30, 2018); Craig Pirrong, The Economics of Central Clearing: Theory and Practice, ISDA 
DISCUSSION PAPERS SERIES, May 2011; Peirce, supra; Krug, infra note 122, at 1618 n.320 (drawing on 
comment letters from industry participants potentially affected by the new regulations, Anita Krug 
explains the potential harm from overregulation). 
119. As discussed at the end of Part I, CFTC guidance explaining the application of these 
regulations to activities outside the United States became effective in the fall of 2013. 
120. This Article examines changes in swap activity at a high level, without relying on 
discretionary controls to pick up secondary effects. This Article does not rule out that regulation may 
have had positive or negative effects of a relatively low magnitude on levels of interest rate swap activity. 
121. See supra Part I.B. 
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dealers before being offset through one or more transactions with other end-users. 
Thus, trades between swap dealers and customers create a “retail” market providing 
the last mile of risk shifting service between dealers and their customers, while  
intra-dealer markets serve as wholesale pipes for risk between major financial 
institutions. CFTC data shows that swaps usage by end-users has appreciably 
increased during the period of intense decline in the overall U.S. swaps market.122 
 
 
Figure III.A: IRS Notional by Market Participant Category 
Figure III.A shows that while swap-dealers’ outstanding interest rate swap 
notional declined from over 300 trillion USD to just over 150 trillion USD in an 
approximately four year period, end-users’ outstanding notional grew from about 
64 trillion USD to 75 trillion USD during the same period.123 In other words, there 
is no evidence that regulation had first order deleterious effects on swaps usage in 
the broader economy.124 Title VII does not appear to have appreciably interfered 
with end-users’ swap consumption in the United States. If regulation had 
substantially increased the costs of providing swaps and prevailing prices were 
 
122. Cf. Anita K. Krug, Investing and Pretending, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1559, 1565 (2015) (arguing 
that Title VII swap regulations burdened legitimate risk management by end-users). 
123. Because it is based on CFTC data, Figure III.A only shows U.S. swaps market activity. 
124. It is possible that absent swaps regulation, the growth in end-user swaps usage would be 
even higher. That story relies on a factor increasing swap usage among end-users coinciding with the 
onset of regulation and offsetting a drop due to that regulation. There is no factor to this author’s 
knowledge that could lead to an increase in end-user swap usage at a magnitude similar to the observed 
decrease in swap-dealer’s swap usage. The maintenance of swap activity by U.S. banks on a consolidated 
basis throughout this period further corroborates that there was no major economic impetus increasing 
swaps usage. 
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competitive, Economics 101 predicts that those costs would be passed on to 
customers and result in lower consumption of swaps. 
Figure III.A helps identify the source of the decline in U.S. swaps activity. The 
decline is owed to reduced notionals outstanding on contracts between swap 
dealers. There are approximately one hundred registered swap dealer entities, most 
of which are well-known banks or their affiliates.125 Changes in behavior among 
this group of entities explain the observed decline of well over thirty three percent 
in U.S. swap activity. While the market between end-users and consumers of swaps 
in the U.S. has remained constant or grown, the inter-dealer market in the U.S. has 
cratered. The question then shifts from explaining a reduction in U.S. swap markets 
to a reduction in wholesale U.S. swap markets. Is it the case that swap dealers truly 
trade fewer swaps with one another in the post-Title VII world? Or is there 
something else explaining the observed decline in U.S. swaps activity? 
OCC data helps answer these questions. The data aggregates quarterly 
Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income (Call Reports) from all U.S. banks 
and their subsidiaries on a global basis.126 These banks include many of the largest 
interest rate swap dealers in the United States.127 OCC data shows that on a 
consolidated basis, interest rate swap activity by U.S. bank swap dealers has not 
appreciably declined. The empirical results of this paper turn on a key difference in 
the scope of coverage between CFTC and OCC data. Transactions between a  
U.S. bank and an offshore counterparty are visible in both CFTC and OCC data, 
 
125. U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, DODD-FRANK ACT  
PROVISIONALLY REGISTERED  SWAP  DEALERS,  https://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/
DoddFrankAct/registerswapdealer.html [https://perma.cc/8L3P-54ZK] ( last updated Sept. 30, 
2019). Non-bank participation in dealing interest rate swaps has historically been negligibly low. See 
BANK OF INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, STATISTICAL RELEASE: OTC DERIVATIVES STATISTICS 
AT END-JUNE 2017 (Nov. 2, 2017) (explaining that bank regulators participating in the BIS derivatives 
survey represent approximately 96% of the over-the-counter interest rate market share). However, at 
least one firm has recently emerged as a non-bank provider of interest rate swaps. Interest Rate 
Derivatives House of the Year: Citadel Securities, RISK.NET ( Jan. 27, 2016), https://www.risk.net/
awards/2442287/interest-rate-derivatives-house-of-the-year-citadel-securities [https://perma.cc/
ZZE8-JGQF] ( last visited Nov. 18, 2019). An affiliate of an entity “is a person that directly, or 
indirectly through one or more intermediaries, controls or is controlled by, or is under common control 
with, the person specified,” whereas a subsidiary is a person controlled by the referenced entity. See 17 
C.F.R. § 230.405 (2019). 
126. Every national bank, state member bank, insured state nonmember bank, and savings 
association is required to file Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income as of the close of business 
on the last day of each calendar quarter. FEDERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION 
COUNCIL, CONSOLIDATED REPORTS OF CONDITION AND INCOME FOR A BANK WITH DOMESTIC 
AND FOREIGN OFFICES-FFIEC 031 (2018) https://www.ffiec.gov/pdf/FFIEC_forms/FFIEC031 
_201803_f.pdf [https://perma.cc/3AKR-V4G6] ( last visited Nov. 18, 2019). 
127. In re Interest Rate Swaps Antitrust Litigation, 261 F. Supp. 3d 430 (S.D.N.Y. 2017). The 
holding companies controlling major swap dealers in the U.S. are Bank of America Corp., Barclays 
Bank PLC, BNP Paribas, S.A., Citigroup, Inc., Credit Suisse Group AG, Deutsche Bank AG, the 
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., HSBC Bank PLC, J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., Morgan Stanley, Royal Bank 
of Scotland PLS, and UBS AG. Id. at 441 n.1. 
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whereas transactions conducted abroad between an offshore subsidiary of a  
U.S. bank and an offshore counterparty are visible only in OCC data. 
 
Figure III.B charts outstanding interest rate swaps notional for U.S. banks on 
a consolidated basis, which includes their U.S. and foreign subsidiaries. The chart 
uses the last quarter in 2013 as a baseline and presents percentage changes from that 
baseline over the next four years. 
Figure III.B: Consolidated Interest Rate Swap Activity of U.S. Banks 
 
Figure III.C highlights the discrepancy between U.S. only interest rate swaps 
activity by dealers and consolidated swaps activity by U.S. banks. 
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Figure III.C: Comparison of Swap Dealer U.S. Activity with Global  
U.S. Bank Activity 
How could the U.S. activity of swap dealers have declined by over a third (and 
closer to a half) while the global interest rate swap activity of U.S. banks and their 
subsidiaries have remained constant? There are only two potential answers: 
1. The decline is owed to swap-dealers that are not U.S. banks or their 
subsidiaries, i.e.: (a) entities unrelated to banks, (b) foreign banks and 
their affiliates, or (c) affiliates of U.S. banks that are not U.S. bank 
subsidiaries128; or 
2. U.S. banks moved swap dealing operations to subsidiaries outside of 
the U.S. and beyond CFTC regulation (including reporting 
requirements). 
It is highly unlikely that the first of these two explanations wholly motivates 
the observed trends. As discussed above, consumption of swaps by U.S. customers 
has not declined which is inconsistent with a real decline in swap activity by swap 
dealers (whether affiliated with U.S. banks or not). Absent the advent of immense 
technological or other efficiencies in delivering swaps through the wholesale market 
coincident with the onset of regulation, a real reduction in wholesale markets is 
unlikely given the sustained activity level in end-user markets. 
Moreover, the swap dealing of entities other than U.S. banks and their 
subsidiaries cannot plausibly explain the almost fifty percent decline in inter-dealer 
volumes. The regions in Figure III.D identify the potential sources of declines in 
inter-dealer swap activity. 
 
 
128. See supra note 125. 
Second to Printer_Beylin (Do Not Delete) 2/26/2020  10:56 AM 
530 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:497 
Figure III.D: Decomposition of Potential Sources of Decline 
On a global level, banks and their affiliates provide approximately ninety-six 
percent of interest rate swaps.129 This is shown by the relatively small gap between 
the larger circle representing all swap dealing and the smaller lighter circle 
representing bank affiliated swap dealing in Figure III.D. Thus, the behavior of 
entities unrelated to banks can be largely ignored for purposes of the analysis. 
Although significant participation in U.S. interest rate swap markets (and 
declines therein) may be attributed to non-U.S. banks and their affiliates that 
participation likely falls well short of fifty percent (50%). As explained in more detail 
below, only swaps between non-U.S. entities fall outside the CFTC reporting 
requirements. Available public data shows neither the extent to which foreign swap 
dealers trade with other dealers in the U.S. nor the extent to which non-U.S. dealers 
discontinued or migrated operations following implementation of Title VII. But the 
relocation or discontinuation of these U.S. operations is insufficient to provide a 
likely explanation for the magnitude of the drop in swap dealer notional amounts 
observed in CFTC data. Aggregate swap dealer notionals declined close to a half in 
the relevant period. Non-U.S. bank assets represent at most about a fifth of banking 
 
129. See supra note 125; Li Lin & Jay Surti, Capital Requirements for Over-the-Counter Derivatives 
Central Counterparties 9 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper 13/3, 2013) (“Systemically important 
banks’ [sic] (SIBs) are dominant players in the [over the counter derivatives] markets.”). Coffee, supra 
note 3, at 1284 (referring to banks as the largest swap dealers). 
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assets in the United States.130 Although it is likely that a substantial contribution to 
the reduction in U.S. swap activity stems from changes in swap dealing by  
non-U.S. swap dealers such as Barclays, BNP Paribas, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, 
HSBC, RBS and UBS, these changes are unlikely to be sufficient to explain the 
massive decline in U.S. inter-dealer trading. 
U.S. banks and their affiliates explain at least a significant portion of the 
observed decline. Typically, holding companies that own a U.S. bank (known as 
bank holding companies or BHCs) concentrate the great majority of their assets and 
activities within the bank and its subsidiaries.131 This is particularly true for interest 
rate swap activity.132 The OCC provides a report comparing derivatives activity 
within the bank and its subsidiaries to BHC-wide derivative activity. This report 
shows that over sixty percent of the revenues from swap activity are generated in 
banks or bank subsidiaries, confirming that the majority of swap dealing takes place 
inside banks and their subsidiaries rather than in other parts of the BHC.133 Thus 
over ninety-six percent (96%) of U.S. swap dealing takes place from banks or bank 
affiliates; assuming bank assets correlate with swap dealing, about eighty percent 
(80%) of bank affiliated U.S. swap dealing is from U.S. banks and their affiliates; 
and over sixty percent (60%) of swap dealing by U.S. banks and their affiliates is 
out of banks and their subsidiaries. In other words, swap dealing by U.S. banks and 
their subsidiaries can be expected to account for approximately forty-five percent 
(45%) of all U.S. swap dealing. Can an almost fifty percent (50%) drop in  
inter-dealer activity be explained by activity of swap dealers outside that forty-five 
percent (45%)? It is arithmetically possible, but it is highly statistically improbable 
that the activity of U.S. banks and their subsidiaries does not take a substantial role 
in that explanation.134 And that activity shows only a minor decline on a 
 
130. FED. RESERVE BD., SHARE DATA FOR THE U.S. OFFICES OF FOREIGN BANKING 
ORGANIZATIONS (2019), https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/iba/fboshr.htm [https://
perma.cc/G8FL-ZF27] ( last visited Nov. 18, 2019). 
131. Dafna Avraham, Patricia Selvaggi & James Vickery, A Structural View of  
U.S. Bank Holding Companies, 18(2) FRBNY ECON. POL’Y REV. 65, 71 tbl.1 (2012)., https://
www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/epr/12v18n2/1207avra.pdf [https://perma.cc/
58NZ-Z7ZG] ( last visited on July 30, 2018). 
132. Orlando Fernández, The Dodd Frank Act’s Pushout Rule: Implications for the Derivatives 
Market, THOMSON REUTERS PRACTICAL LAW ( Jan. 13, 2011). 
133. Compare OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, QUARTERLY REPORT ON 
BANK TRADING AND DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES (FOURTH QUARTER 2017) at 4, tbl. 1 (reporting 
$4.034 billion in national revenues from interest rate and foreign exchange derivatives at the bank and 
bank subsidiary level) [hereinafter QUARTERLY REPORT], with id. at 4, tbl.2 (reporting $6.606 billion in 
national revenues from interest rate and foreign exchange derivatives across all BHCs). Historically, 
more than 61% of interest rate and foreign exchange derivatives was traded out of banks and their 
subsidiaries rather than other BHC affiliates. 
134. Among others, the OCC data covers consolidated global swaps activity by JP Morgan 
Chase Bank NA, Citibank National Association, Goldman Sachs Bank USA, Bank of America NA, 
Wells Fargo Bank NA, HSBC NA, State Street Bank & Trust Co, Bank of New York Mellon, PNC 
Bank National Association, U.S. Bank National Association, Northern Trust Co., Suntrust Bank, and 
Morgan Stanley Bank NA. See QUARTERLY REPORT, supra note 133, at app. tbl.3. 
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consolidated basis, showing that to the extent U.S. banks and their subsidiaries 
explain the drop observed in CFTC data, that explanation is due to banks relocating 
their dealing operations into off-shore subsidiaries. News stories support the view 
that U.S. banks created offshore subsidiaries outside the CFTC’s purview to carry 
on dealing operations.135 
Changes in the swap dealing activities of U.S. banks and their subsidiaries likely 
motivate a substantial portion of the decline observed in U.S. swaps markets.  
Inter-dealer swap activity by entities other than U.S. banks and their subsidiaries is 
likely inadequate to explain the decline in volume observed within the U.S.  
inter-dealer market. Since on a consolidated basis, U.S. bank swap activity has not 
substantially declined, as significant portion of the decline is owed to the migration 
of swap activity from U.S. banks to their foreign subsidiaries. The next section 
explains the cross-border reach of swaps regulations under Title VII and explores 
the migration of swap activity from U.S. markets. 
III. DOES THE SWAP EXPERIENCE SUPPORT INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL 
REGULATION THEORY? 
The preceding analysis supports that the advent of regulation coincided with 
significant migration of wholesale swap operations from the United States. The 
analysis also shows that the swap activity of U.S. end-users did not appreciably 
decline (in fact, it increased). These observations inform related inquiries central to 
scholarship on financial regulation: Did the exclusion of non-U.S. entities’ swap 
activities with other non-U.S. persons undermine the policy goals of Title VII? And 
more generally, is migration of financial activity a constraint on unilateral financial 
regulation? The theory developed in this Part, consistent with observation of 
relocation in the wake of regulation, shows that migration reduces the arsenal of 
tools available to achieve regulatory priorities but does not empty that arsenal. The 
theory also identifies that the vulnerability of financial regulation to mobility 
depends on the policy goal being implemented. Policy goals targeting the 
relationship between financial services providers and end-users, such as consumer 
 
135. Charles Levinson, U.S. Banks Moved Billions of Dollars in Trades Beyond Washington’s 
Reach, REUTERS (Aug. 21, 2015), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-swaps/ 
[https://perma.cc/9XGG-Q96D] ( last visited Nov. 18, 2019) (“Major banks had tweaked a few key 
words in swaps contracts and shifted some other trades to affiliates in London, where regulations are 
far more lenient. Those affiliates remain largely outside the jurisdiction of U.S. regulators, thanks to a 
loophole in swaps rules that banks successfully won from the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
in 2013.”); Thomas J. McCartin, A Derivative in Need: Rescuing U.S. Security-Based Swaps from the Race 
to the Bottom, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 361, 364 (2015) (explaining that non-regulation of swap activity by 
foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies created opportunities for regulatory arbitrage prompting 
migration of swap activity offshore); see also Bonnie Kavoussi, Seven Largest U.S. Banks Have Created 
Thousands Of Subsidiaries To Avoid Taxes: Fed Report, HUFFINGTON POST ( July 23, 2012), https://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/23/big-banks-subsidiaries_n_1694458.html [https://perma.cc/
8L4K-WDPW] ( last visited July 30, 2018). 
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protection and end-user market transparency, have been largely immune to 
mobility. In contrast, policy goals such as the containment of systemic risk and 
reduction of discriminatory pricing are more susceptible to offshoring. As discussed 
below, however, a number of mitigants can be deployed within the United States to 
dampen if not wholly mute the pernicious effects of migration. That these mitigants 
have not been adopted speaks as much to general limitations on regulatory efficacy 
as to the challenges posed by migration. 
A. How Relocation of Swaps Activity Compromised Policy Goals 
Title VII was enacted to “reduce risk, increase transparency, and promote 
market integrity within the financial system.”136 The following discussion explores 
how the movement of non-U.S. facing swap activity into foreign subsidiaries 
undermined these three distinct policy goals. 
1. Systemic Risk 
Financial risk can be reduced down to risk of lower revenues or risk of higher 
expenses (or lower cash in-flows or higher cash out-flows).137 How can the 
unregulated activities of a foreign subsidiary increase risk of loss to the U.S. parent? 
If the subsidiary follows a riskier policy, the value of the parent’s equity in the 
subsidiary may be more volatile.138 Alternately, the parent may guarantee payments 
on certain contracts by the subsidiary and be directly liable in the event of subsidiary 
default.139 Or the defaults of a subsidiary can trigger cross-defaults under the 
parent’s obligations.140 Finally, even without legal obligations, a U.S. bank may 
voluntarily bail out a subsidiary, even though the parent enjoys limited liability.141 
These are risks that can flow into the U.S. financial system from the unregulated 
activity of foreign subsidiaries. If congressional views that unregulated swap market 
activity contributed significantly to the financial crisis and broader economic 
decline of 2008 are correct, then the migration of U.S. banks’ swap dealing 
operations into foreign subsidiaries discussed above poses substantial risk of 
precipitating another crisis. 
 
136. Business Conduct Standards for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants with 
Counterparties, 77 Fed. Reg. 9733, 9735 (Feb. 17, 2012). See SIFMA v. CFTC, 67 F. Supp. 3d at 387. 
137. This assertion is not intended to minimize that secondary factors, such as volatility and 
uncertainty, leverage, inter-connectivity and asymmetric information can exacerbate or mitigate losses. 
138. This assumes the subsidiary is compensated for additional risk through higher expected 
returns. If the subsidiary makes unwise decisions to take on more risk, the value of the parent’s equity 
would not only be more volatile but also lower (even without a discount for volatility). 
139. Coffee, supra note 3, at 1285 (“U.S. banks can avoid U.S. rules by using a foreign subsidiary 
and only ‘implicitly’ guaranteeing [sic] its debt.”). 
140. Anthony J. Casey, The New Corporate Web: Tailored Entity Partitions and Creditors’ 
Selective Enforcement, 124 YALE L.J. 2680, 2683 n.5 (2015). 
141. See, e.g., Julie Creswell & Vikas Bajaj, $3.2 Billion Move by Bear Stearns to Rescue Fund,  
N.Y. TIMES  ( June  23,  2007),  https://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/23/business/23bond.html 
[https://perma.cc/6NMX-AZNZ] ( last visited July 30, 2018). 
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2. Market Transparency 
Market transparency could benefit from non-U.S. subsidiaries reporting swap 
transaction data with non-U.S. counterparties and application of other Title VII 
initiatives abroad. European initiatives to bring market transparency to swap 
markets have been less fruitful than those of the U.S.142 Having more data on the 
prices at which transactions have been recently executed and could be executed in 
the near future provides valuable information to market participants, including 
those seeking to value inventories.143 Furthermore, in addition to the informational 
benefits from ongoing reporting, there would be the transparency benefits from 
comprehensive recordkeeping required under Title VII.144 The costs of migration 
to market transparency, however, are likely to be relatively light given the substantial 
amount of activity that remains in the United States. Recordkeeping interests are a 
related concern to market transparency that geographically limited regulation 
compromises. Recordkeeping ensures that prior dealings and current positions are 
available to private parties and regulatory supervisors for analysis. 
3. Market Integrity 
Efforts to enhance market integrity were intended to protect end-users from 
information asymmetries and potential exploitation by dealers.145 Limitations on the 
applicability of Title VII obligations to trades between non-U.S. persons and  
non-U.S. subsidiaries of U.S. banks can implicate these concerns. Did the 
movement of swap activity expose the protected group to risk of abuse? The 
reduction in trading was concentrated in inter-dealer activity.146 Many of the  
anti-abuse rules are expressly limited to transactions between dealers and  
end-users.147 Levels of end-user swap usage subject to Title VII protections were 
not affected, and there is no evidence that non-U.S. subsidiaries were used to 
 
142. Amir Khwaja, EMIR Trade Reporting and Public Data: What s the Point?, CLARUS 
FIN.TECH. (April 28, 2014), https://www.clarusft.com/emir-trade-reporting-and-public-data-what-is-
the-point/ [https://perma.cc/KB9Q-5P35] ( last visited July 30, 2018). 
143. See Ilya Beylin, Taxing Fictive Orders: How an Information-Forcing Tax Can Reduce 
Manipulation and Distortion in Financial Product Markets, 85 U. CIN. L. REV. 91, 99 (2017); Kevin 
Haeberle, Stock Market Law and the Accuracy of Public Companies’ Stock Prices, 2015  
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 121 (2015); Urska Velikonja, The Cost of Securities Fraud, 54 WM. & MARY  
L. REV. 1887 (2013). 
144. See supra note 79. 
145. Business Conduct Standards for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants with 
Counterparties, 77 Fed. Reg. 9733, 9743 (Feb. 17, 2012) (“Taken together, the final rules materially 
enhance the ability of counterparties to assess the merits of entering into any particular swap transaction 
and reduce information asymmetries between swap dealers and . . . their counterparties.”). 
146. Opting out of standards intended to protect counterparties from better informed swap 
dealers does not come across as very troubling when the transaction is between two swap dealers. 
147. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 23.431, 23.440, 23.450. See also Coffee, supra note 3, at 1287 (arguing 
that international swap regulation should “focus more on those factors that truly relate to systemic risk 
(e.g., capital, leverage, margin, etc.) and less on rules that relate to consumer protection or business 
conduct.”). 
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circumvent trading with U.S. end-users.148 As for trading with non-U.S. end-users, 
there is a question of whether U.S. customer protection laws are meant to protect 
non-U.S. clienteles? Home country regulators of those clienteles could have their 
own views of appropriate protective measures for their domestic companies. And 
those foreign companies could (if they wanted to) avail themselves of Title VII 
protections through trading with U.S. based swap dealers rather than their foreign 
subsidiaries. This approach would be a variant of the bonding hypothesis developed 
by John Coffee in the securities context.149 The bonding hypothesis explains  
cross-listing behavior of foreign issuers on U.S. exchanges as, in part, an opting into  
U.S. securities law for the benefits of higher investor protections. Just as issuers can 
partner with investors in committing to heightened investor protection by listing on 
an exchange, end users can partner with dealers to opt into the customer protection 
rules initiated by Title VII. In this manner, the protective benefits of market 
integrity focused regulations could be exported at the election of foreign end-users. 
The Title VII experience also illustrates an interesting exception to the general 
principle that customers control whether customer-protection goals of a regulatory 
regime are met. As explained in Part I, prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, there were two 
types of markets for swaps: (a) a “wholesale”, inter-dealer market, and (b) a “retail” 
market for end-users. There is a view that dealers offered each other preferential 
pricing in the former type of market, increasing relative costs for customers.150 Title 
VII imposed registration and open access requirements on the electronic platforms 
that were serving as inter-dealer markets. These requirements were meant to reduce 
oligopolistic pricing and increase pre-trade price transparency.151 But these goals 
were substantially circumvented as a number of foreign trading platforms limited 
access to U.S. persons so as to be excluded from registration requirements as a SEF 
or DCM and attendant open access mandates.152 Thus swap dealers were able to 
retain two bands of pricing, and potentially continue oligopolistic extraction at the 
expense of end-users through moving inter-dealer trades abroad. Where a regulation 
polices how terms between one group of market participants compare with the 
terms of another group of market participants—rather than sets absolute 
requirements on terms between market participants—mobility can undermine 
consumer protection notwithstanding that consumers are free to stay put (and 
indeed, do appear to stay put). Short of traditional antitrust approaches or directly 
policing pricing, it may be difficult to implement policies restricting financial 
 
148. The longer term potential of U.S. end users setting up offshore subsidiaries to engage in 
unregulated swap trading is discussed below. 
149. See supra note 8. 
150. See supra note 23 and surrounding text. 
151. Because SEF and DCM requirements were also meant to contribute to pre-trade price 
transparency, the arguments in this paragraph relate both to market transparency and market integrity. 
152. SIFMA v. CFTC, 67 F. Supp. 3d at 403–05 (D.D.C. 2014). 
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institutions from discriminating among counterparties without  
international harmonization.153 
The subversion of rules meant to enact inclusive markets reveals a broader 
threat from the relocation of financial institutions. When inter-dealer markets move 
beyond regulation, the health of U.S. markets is implicated to the extent  
U.S. markets rely on the function of the migrating market. If an offshore market 
exhibits pathologies, entities that do not transact in the market may be affected so 
long as they are holding related positions. 
B. The Potential for Territorially Circumscribed Unilateral Financial Regulation 
The above discussion shows how migration has undermined some more than 
other Dodd-Frank policy goals. Given that a national regulatory regime will have 
some geographic limits,154 does that mean a nation cannot effectively regulate 
financial activity unilaterally? Pierre-Hugues Verdier theorizes that “the rise of 
private international finance creates challenges for national regulation that states 
cannot fully address by acting unilaterally.”155 Chris Brummer concisely articulates 
the view of jurisdictional selection as a constraint on unilateral financial  
regulation: “[F]inancial institutions dissatisfied with one jurisdiction’s rules can 
increasingly move to another with weaker and potentially suboptimal oversight to 
raise capital or engage in complex financial transactions.”156 Theorists view mobility 
as a key threat to unilateral financial regulation.157 Is this a significant threat in 
 
153. Some argue that the open access model is inappropriate for low-liquidity products such as 
some swaps. See GIANCARLO & TUCKMAN, supra note 60. In this case, the flight of inter-dealer swap 
markets may represent a desirable circumvention of regulatory priorities. 
154. Itai Grinberg, The New International Tax Diplomacy, 104 GEO. L.J. 1137, 1144 (2016); 
Cross-Border Guidance, supra note 91, at 45,324 (“The Commission understands that commenters are 
concerned that foreign entities, in order to avoid swap dealer status, may decrease their swap dealing 
business with foreign branches of U.S. registered swap dealers and guaranteed affiliates that are swap 
dealers”). 
155. Verdier, supra note 3, at 1437. 
156. Brummer, supra note 3, at 267. See Grinberg, supra note 154, at 1155 (“[L]ike multinational 
corporate activity more generally, international finance is by nature highly mobile (indeed, in some 
respects, more mobile). Rules targeting mobile capital, whether they involve tax or finance, are 
inherently more difficult and inherently more likely to lead to competitive responses among states than 
rules targeting product markets directly, because unlike capital, consumers rarely move to another 
jurisdiction in response to strict regulatory standards”); Annelise Riles, Managing Regulatory  
Arbitrage: A Conflict of Laws Approach, 47 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 63, 65 (2014) (“The ability of financial 
institutions to act beyond the reach of regulators threatens the sovereignty of nation-states and the well 
being of national economies. Yet as regulators are well aware, the threat is possible only because of 
differences in national regulatory regimes.”)(internal citations omitted);Chris Brummer, Corporate Law 
Preemption in an Age of Global Capital Markets, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1067, 1089–103 (2008). 
157. David Zaring, Financial Reform’s Internationalism, 65 EMORY L.J. 1255 (2016); Brummer, 
supra note 3, at 262–63; Beth Simmons, The International Politics of Harmonization: The Case of Capital 
Market Regulation, 55 INT’L ORG. 589 (2001); David Zaring, International Law by Other Means: The 
Twilight Existence of International Financial Regulatory Organizations, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J. 281, 286 (1998). 
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practice? The evidence points to the threat being both real and  
significantly overstated. 
1. End-user Swap Activity Unaffected in the Short Term 
The experience of end-users after the implementation of Title VII qualifies 
both views that regulation severely impedes economic function and views that 
regulation can be easily avoided. Figure III.A shows that end-users continued using 
swaps subject to U.S. regulation following the implementation of Dodd-Frank. 
There is no evidence that customers reduced using regulated swaps either in 
substance or through relocation abroad. Subsequent research may find that the 
increase in customer usage of swaps within the United States would have been 
greater but for the regulation of swap markets, although a baseline that removes the 
impact of swap regulation may be difficult to establish. What is clear is that a 
massive regulatory intervention into swaps markets did not significantly interfere 
with customer access to swaps.158 In contrast to inter-swap dealer activity,  
U.S.-based speculation and hedging through swaps did not decline in the relevant 
period. The lack of evidence that consumers of financial products were ready to 
relocate to enable suppliers to avoid regulatory burdens supports that unilateral 
regulation may be used to achieve some forms of customer protection.159 
Many critiques of unilateral financial regulation focus narrowly on the mobility 
of capital sources or, less narrowly, on the mobility of financial institutions.160 But 
neither capital mobility nor mobility of financial institutions is sufficient to enable 
regulatory arbitrage. Financial services are services and as such only provide 
revenues to the financial institution if there is a client consuming them. It is 
insufficient for the source of capital or the financial institution to be mobile if 
regulation is also triggered by the customer being within the territory of the 
regulator. The provision of most if not all financial services depends on a contract 
performed between at least two persons one of which is a financial intermediary. 
This provides several touchpoints for territorially circumscribed nexus to attach.161 
As discussed above, the CFTC has taken a territorial approach that applies 
swap regulation if either the swap dealer or its counterparty is a U.S. person (or the 
transaction is conducted out of the United States). That means that end-users would 
themselves have to also relocate for the transaction to escape the reach of 
regulation. Financial services are an important ingredient to the successful operation 
 
158. It is left to subsequent work to explore whether and under what circumstances restraints 
on swap activity may have social costs. Subsequent studies may look to, among other things, whether 
adding to the cost of risk management resulted in excess bankruptcy filings. Subsequent work may also 
look to whether super-competitive pricing in swaps markets results in no significant changes in price 
with the increase of regulatory costs. 
159.  John Armour, Martin Bengtzen & Luca Enriques, Investor Choice in Global Securities 
Markets 13 (ECGI Working Paper Series in Law, Working Paper No. 371/2017, 2017) (discussing 
challenges in unilateral securities market regulation). 
160. See supra notes 155–56. 
161. Armour, Bengtzen & Enriques, supra note 159, at 13–19. 
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of businesses. Yet there are many other ingredients, and it is questionable whether 
a business would be willing to engage in the steps necessary to move its 
consumption of financial services outside the ambit of U.S. regulation to reduce 
regulatory costs. Key factors to assessing whether a business would create an 
offshore entity with offshore operations to receive financial services are: (a) what 
are the costs of creating that offshore presence and (b) what are the benefits from 
obtaining a lighter regulatory regime from the perspective of the business and its 
prospective financial services providers? The second of these two questions turns 
largely on the net savings between the business and its service provider due to 
decreased regulatory obligations. That decrease depends on the fixed costs and 
variable costs of compliance as well as the frequency of regulated transactions (for 
measuring total variable costs). The balance of these factors is expected to disfavor 
relocation due to the typically substantial costs of relocation, the infrequency and 
insignificance of financial services in the business model of the customer, and the 
low amount of surplus in regulatory savings that can be shared between customers 
and their financial services providers. 
In the context of key financial services, the costs of customer relocation are 
expected to be particularly significant. Is relocation practicable with respect to a 
range of financial services involving potential customer liabilities: (1) loans;  
(2) underwriting; (3) swaps? To reduce regulatory burdens (and presumably share 
the resulting surplus) would a client be willing to form a foreign subsidiary, operate 
it abroad and source financial services through that subsidiary? Would a financial 
counterparty be willing to transact with that subsidiary? As the rest of this discussion 
shows, the content of financial services matters when discussing how nimble private 
efforts at circumvention may be. For example, lending is very different from deposit 
taking because lending requires the bank to rely on the creditworthiness of the 
customer. Without delving into loan underwriting standards, it is intuitive that a 
bank would not typically lend to an uncapitalized subsidiary that has no operating 
assets. Similarly, could regulations on underwriting be skirted through the client 
creating a foreign subsidiary? Who would invest in a shell with no operations or 
assets? Could swap regulations be avoided through creating an empty foreign 
subsidiary? As discussed in more detail below, the answer is generally a resounding 
“no.”162 Banks, investors, and other financial market participants require effective 
recourse when the transaction creates a customer obligation. The rest of this 
discussion furthers the literature on jurisdictional selection in response to financial 
regulation through focusing on service specific capacities for mobility. 
The empirical findings reviewed above cast a light on a practical constraint to 
jurisdictional selection in response to financial regulation neglected by the literature. 
Customer cooperation is typically required for financial institutions to avoid unilateral 
 
162. See Grinberg, supra note 154, at 1155 (“[C]onsumers rarely move to another jurisdiction in 
response to strict regulatory standards.”); Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1,  
17 (2012). 
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territorial regulation of a range of services aimed at protecting market participants. Under 
robust territorial regulation, that cooperation requires more than legal structuring. 
It requires a genuine relocation of assets and operations, including the headquarters 
of the entity. This point is worth repeating. It is not sufficient to incur what are 
typically referred to as transaction costs163 to avoid unilateral, territorial financial 
regulation through relocation. Rather, actual movement of assets and decisional 
resources is required.164 Not only that, but the personnel involved in the transaction 
would need to be present in the new jurisdiction.165 So not only the management of 
the entity but also the financial personnel negotiating the loan, underwriting or swap 
with the relevant bank would need to work from another country. An investment 
fund or other financial business that relies extensively on financial services may face 
sufficient returns from sharing the surplus from deregulation to relocate, but most 
businesses probably would not absent uncommonly costly regulations. Although at 
the border it is an empirical question, as a matter of common sense it is unlikely that 
the surplus from partnering in regulatory arbitrage in what are infrequent 
transactions incidental to operating a non-financial business would outweigh the 
expense of transitioning operations into another jurisdiction.166 This intuition is 
reflected in corporate and tax167 scholarship on jurisdictional selection. 
Mitchell Kane and Edward Rock explore the interdependence of jurisdictional 
selection for corporate and tax law.168 Under the internal affairs doctrine, the 
corporate law governing the relationship between the corporation, its officers, 
directors and shareholders is determined by the state where the corporation is 
 
163. Transaction costs are the search and information costs to identifying a potentially desirable 
exchange, the bargaining and decision costs of entering into that exchange, and the policing and 
enforcement costs of ensuring compliance with the exchange. Carl J. Dahlman, The Problem of 
Externality, 22 J.L. & ECON. 141, 148 (1979). 
164. See Cross-Border Guidance, supra note 91, at 45309 (requiring the principal place of 
business of an entity to be outside the United States to avoid the reach of swap regulation and explaining 
the principal place of business “should normally be the place where the corporation maintains its 
headquarters—provided that the headquarters is the actual center of direction, control and 
coordination, i.e., the ‘nerve center,’ and not simply an office where the corporation holds its board 
meetings.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 80 (2010). 
165. See Grinberg, supra note 154, at 1154 (“Now imagine if [altering tax consequences] also 
requires shifting activity; be that labor generally or particularly attractive research and development or 
headquarters activity. In this case, the distributional consequences [between sovereigns] can affect both 
government revenue and national employment.”). 
166. Indirect transactions with U.S. non-financial businesses are also less likely to implicate 
systemic risk concerns. See Cross-Border Guidance, supra note 91, at 45,324 (exempting transactions 
with a non-U.S. affiliate guaranteed by a U.S. non-financial entity from counting towards the swap dealer 
de minimis threshold). 
167. See David M. Schizer, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1312 
(2001) (discussing transaction costs as a constraint on tax arbitrage). 
168. Kane & Rock, supra note 6. 
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incorporated.169 This determination does not take into account the location of 
corporate management, operations, assets or other tangible facets of corporate 
existence. It is relatively easy, Kane and Rock show, for a U.S. firm to select its 
corporate law from among the available state regimes simply by changing the state 
of its incorporation (e.g., by creating a subsidiary in the desired jurisdiction and 
merging the parent into that subsidiary).170 On the other hand, where the applicable 
law turns on the facts such as where the headquarters of an entity are located 
“changing jurisdictions . . . is often so costly as to be prohibitive.”171 Other scholars 
agree with this intuition172 and empirical surveys of firm responses to regulation 
generally support that business mobility to take advantage or regulatory disparities 
is limited.173 A modest requirement could help ensure the “reality” of territorial 
treatment in recognizing work as occurring in a jurisdiction only if the individual 
performing it has a status such as permanent residency in that jurisdiction. For 
management or negotiation to be seen as occurring in a foreign jurisdiction, the 
individuals involved should be required to continuously reside in that jurisdiction. 
The preceding discussion applies generally to the prospects of customer 
collusion with regulatory avoidance. It is a non-trivial task to move what Kane and 
Rock refer to as the “real seat”174 of an entity through creation of a foreign 
subsidiary and offshoring its principal place of business. But the challenges are even 
greater in the context of services creating long term customer obligations such as 
loans, underwriting or swaps. It is not enough for the customer to create a foreign 
subsidiary and then transfer personnel and other operational resources into that 
subsidiary and physically relocate them abroad. The customer must also assure the 
financial services provider that any obligations the subsidiary incurs in the course 
of receiving the services will be repaid with an adequate rate of return.175 That either 
requires a transfer of assets that can support the obligation or a guarantee from an 
affiliate with the financial wherewithal to make good on the obligation. Both are 
 
169. See Frederick Tung, Before Competition: Origins of the Internal Affairs Doctrine, 32  
J. CORP. L. 33, 39 (2006); Vincent S.J. Buccola, Opportunism and Internal Affairs, 93 TUL. L. REV. 339 
(2018). 
170. Kane & Rock, supra note 6, at 1236. 
171. Id. at 1237. 
172. Eric L. Talley, supra note 6, at 1676. 
173. Carruthers & Lamoreaux, supra note 5 (reviewing literature). 
174. Kane & Rock, supra note 6, at 1235. 
175. The surrounding discussion is not intended to suggest that subsidiaries are generally 
formed for illegitimate purposes. There is a wide range of scholarship explaining respectable and 
practical uses housing assets and operations in subsidiaries serves. See Douglas G. Baird & Anthony  
J. Casey, No Exit? Withdrawal Rights and the Law of Corporate Reorganizations, 113  
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 17–18 (2013) (explaining how private ordering can take place through creation of 
subsidiaries within a mandatory bankruptcy regime); Edward M. Iacobucci & George G. Triantis, 
Economic and Legal Boundaries of Firms, 93 VA. L. REV. 515, 568 (2007) (explaining how partitioning 
of assets across subsidiaries may allow more informed and less expensive financing). But cf. Richard 
Squire, Strategic Liability in the Corporate Group, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 605 (2011) (arguing that the 
benefits of subsidiaries are inconsistent with the practice of affiliate cross-guarantees). 
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explored further below, as the discussion turns first to formal and implicit 
guarantees and then reviews treasury affiliates that may serve as conduits to swap 
transactions. 
At the outset, it is important to note that asset transfers are expensive because 
they reduce the transferor affiliate’s assets (e.g., if a parent transfers unencumbered 
title to a plot of land to its subsidiary to be used as collateral for the financing 
service, the parent acting alone can no longer borrow against that plot of land). Due 
to structural subordination, the contribution of assets to a subsidiary to support 
external financing to the subsidiary reduces assets available to claim-holders on the 
parent. In the best case scenario from the standpoint of the avoidance partnership 
between the U.S. customer and financial institution, the financing would be used 
to purchase liquid assets with non-volatile values that could be held at the subsidiary 
to effectively collateralize the loan.176 Yet, it is relatively rare that operating 
businesses seek financing to purchase something like high grade securities or gold. 
Instead, the financing would likely go towards operating assets that would need a 
substantial top-off from the parent because of their limited expected secondary 
market value. Thus, from the perspective of the U.S. customer, there would usually 
be an appreciable cost to receiving financing through an otherwise empty offshore 
subsidiary. A similar cost would arise in swap transactions, which are risk shifting 
rather than financing transactions but nevertheless involve the potential for long 
term customer liabilities. To ensure the foreign subsidiary of the U.S. customer 
would be able to meet its potential future obligations under the swap, the parent 
would need to transfer assets akin to initial and variation margin to the subsidiary. 
This would have costs similar to those described above. 
As an alternative to providing separate assets to a foreign entity, the  
U.S. customer could guarantee the foreign subsidiary’s obligations. This is a 
straightforward manner for assuring the subsidiary can repay financial obligations 
from the parent’s assets. However, the cross-border reach of swap regulations has 
 
176. The preceding discussion considers financing assets at the subsidiary level. If instead, the 
U.S. customer routed the financing through the subsidiary and purchased assets at the U.S. entity level, 
substantially greater service fees would be involved. The need to retain credit support at the subsidiary 
means financing transactions routed through the subsidiary will be less effective because the subsidiary 
will need to retain a portion of the net financing to the U.S. parent. This reduction need not be on a 
one-for-one basis due to differences in tax and other costs to financing the subsidiary relative to the 
parent (including, potentially, the relatively higher regulatory burdens of servicing the parent directly); 
however, the difference is not expected to be drastic. Even if only seventy-five percent of the proceeds 
from the financing transaction need to be retained at the subsidiary to satisfy the bank counterparty, 
the resulting expense of the avoidance strategy is extraordinary. To achieve the same level of financing 
as it would have received directly, the customer would need to engage in a transaction four times as 
large as it would need to if transacting directly with the bank. That means the bank would need to 
reduce its fees by seventy five percent when dealing with the subsidiary to offer the same economics. 
What is the likelihood that the regulatory costs of dealing directly with the parent exceed seventy five 
percent of the fee the bank charges? 
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been drawn to limit this strategy.177 Transactions between a non-U.S. swap dealer 
and a non-U.S. entity that has a guarantee from a U.S. affiliate are subject to swap 
regulations.178 The CFTC and SEC view a wide range of financial support 
arrangements as guarantees for this purpose.179 Thus a U.S. customer could not 
simply create a foreign subsidiary, establish a small headquarters for it in the relevant 
jurisdiction, guarantee the subsidiary’s trades, and source swaps from foreign swap 
dealers outside the ambit of Title VII.180 
There are less overt means than express guarantees that provide credit support 
to Potemkin subsidiaries built for partnering in regulatory avoidance. A  
U.S. business could—without entering into a legal agreement—express its intent to 
a service provider to guarantee any shortfall from an offshore subsidiary. Writing in 
the context of tax planning, Alex Raskolnikov has demonstrated how norms (in 
contrast to legal obligations) can enable parties to a transaction to skirt legal 
responsibilities.181 Yet reliance on norms introduces substantial risk, particularly 
where the party being relied on is not a frequent player.182 If a non-U.S. subsidiary 
is not legally guaranteed and will have relatively few assets following the transaction, 
would a non-U.S. bank lend to that subsidiary? Would it enter into a swap 
transaction with that subsidiary? Would non-U.S. underwriters and investors help 
market and purchase securities issued by that subsidiary? Raskolnikov shows that a 
norm is sufficient to skirt taxes on interest from secured lending through 
repackaging the transaction as a sale and repurchase (e.g., municipal securities 
dealers “sell” tax exempt municipal bonds to banks and then “repurchase” them 
shortly thereafter with the bank pocketing the interest on the bond as a tax free 
financing charge).183 Similarly, he shows that higher taxes on short term equity 
trading may be avoided through papering the transactions as long term equity swaps 
and then, with the cooperation of the swap dealer and without explicit rights, 
terminating them or rolling them into other trades.184 Yet in these examples, the 
financial services provider would only lose a fee such as interest or a termination 
 
177. See Cross-Border Guidance, supra note 91, at 45,312. 
178. See id. at 45,355 (substituted compliance is available with respect to transactions between 
“a non-U.S. swap dealer . . . and a non-U.S. counterparty . . . where the non-U.S. counterparty’s 
performance is guaranteed (or otherwise supported by) a U.S. person”). 
179. See id. at 45,320; Coffee, supra note 3, at 1285 (criticizing SEC rules for only reaching 
express rather than implicit guarantees). 
180. Nor could the financial services provider escape swap dealer regulation through trading 
with foreign guaranteed affiliates of U.S. persons. See id. at 45,319 (a “non-U.S. person should count 
only its swap dealing transactions with U.S. persons . . . and with guaranteed affiliates towards the de 
minimis thresholds for swap dealer registration”). 
181. Alex Raskolnikov, The Cost of Norms: Tax Effects of Tacit Understandings, 74  
U. CHI. L. REV. 601 (2007). 
182. Id. at 671 (explaining the relevant costs of defection by a borrower with little repeat play 
and a lender that constantly makes new loans in the market and thus substantially relies on  
reputational capital). 
183. Id. at 626–27. 
184. Id. at 620. 
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charge should the customer defect. In contrast, facing an under-capitalized 
subsidiary on a loan that is disbursed to the subsidiary and then upstreamed by the 
subsidiary to its parent or similar transaction exposes the financial service provider 
to losses of far greater magnitude. It is questionable whether norms are in and of 
themselves adequate to enable these forms of avoidance.185 
The second path to creating a credit-worthy foreign subsidiary is normatively 
more ambiguous than naked attempts at avoidance. That second path involves 
setting up what is generally referred to as a treasury affiliate and organizing that 
affiliate abroad. It is common for large global companies to centralize their hedging 
or risk-management activities in an affiliate commonly referred to as a “treasury” 
entity.186 Under this structure, the treasury entity may enter into swaps with its 
affiliates and then enter into offsetting swaps with swap dealers (or other third 
parties). The CFTC recognizes that this model “promotes operational efficiency 
and prudent risk management by enabling a company to manage its risks on a 
consolidated basis at a group level.”187 The treasury affiliate may be organized as a 
U.S. or non-U.S. subsidiary of the parent company, and the CFTC refers to these 
entities alternately as “conduit affiliates” or “affiliate conduits.” Because a foreign 
treasury entity may serve as an intermediary shifting risk between its U.S. affiliates 
and non-U.S. swap dealers, the CFTC applies swap regulations to the conduct of 
affiliate conduits in some circumstances.188 The regulation of conduit affiliates 
covers some but far from all cases in which a U.S. customer establishes bona fide 
treasury operations abroad to receive swap services from non-U.S. dealers. 
The existence of a path to avoidance is not the same as its regular use. Figure 
III.A shows that U.S. customers have not slowed sourcing swap transactions in the 
United States. Thus, it does not appear that the route left open for regulatory 
 
185. See Alex Raskolnikov, Relational Tax Planning Under Risk-Based Rules, 156  
U. PA. L. REV. 1181 (2008). 
186. Cross-Border Guidance, supra note 91, at 45,358. 
187. Id. 
188. For these purposes, an affiliate conduit is an entity that meets a complex definition, and 
the CFTC has provided inconsistent descriptions of whether and how affiliate conduits may be 
regulated. Compare id. at 45,324 (“The Commission’s policy is to generally allow non-U.S. persons not 
to count toward their de minimis thresholds their swap dealing transactions with . . . a conduit affiliate 
that is not a swap dealer and itself engages in de minimis swap dealing activity and which is affiliated 
with a swap dealer”), with id. at 45,359 (“The Commission does not intend that the term ‘conduit 
affiliate’ would include affiliates of swap dealers.”). In considering whether a non-U.S. person is an 
“affiliate conduit”, the CFTC considers whether: (i) the non-U.S. person is a majority owned affiliate 
of a U.S. person; (ii) the non-U.S. person is controlling, controlled by or under common control with 
the U.S. person; (iii) the financial results of the non-U.S. person are included in the consolidated 
financial statements of the U.S. person; and (iv) the non-U.S. person, in the regular course of business, 
engages in swaps with non-U.S. third-parties for the purpose of hedging or mitigating risks faced by, or 
to take positions on behalf of, its U.S. affiliate(s), and enters into offsetting swaps or other arrangements 
with its U.S. affiliates in order to transfer the risks and benefits of such swaps with third-parties to its 
U.S. affiliates. Id. at 45,359. The CFTC notes that other facts and circumstances also may be relevant 
to determining if an entity is a conduit affiliate. Id. 
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avoidance through mobility has been extensively adopted. This is consistent with 
market participants foregoing the opportunity to reduce regulatory burdens through 
other means.189 A variety of reasons—including implementation costs, uncertainty 
about efficacy, moral reservations, norms, organizational inertia, agency costs 
within legal and compliance departments—can lead customers (or financial services 
providers) to abstain from opportunities to reduce regulatory burdens. Yet, the 
abstention may be temporary, as new market norms, practices and structures may 
take time to gain widespread adoption. 
CFTC guidance on the cross-border reach of Title VII regulations leaves an 
important gap. A U.S. swap customer can, through a bona fide foreign treasury 
entity, generally accept swap dealing services outside the scope of U.S. swap 
regulation.190 The strategy relies on the method by which swap dealer status is 
determined in the cross-border context. Only swaps with U.S. nexus count towards 
a de minimis threshold below which an entity does not have to register as a swap 
dealer or comply with the various requirements applicable to swap dealers.191 A  
non-U.S. person financial institution dealing swaps to foreign treasury affiliates 
(among other non-U.S. persons) would not have to register as a swap dealer and 
thus could avoid the associated Title VII requirements.192 Figure IV.C.1 shows the 
structure for effecting this arrangement.193 In this manner, U.S. customers  
could—through creating offshore treasury affiliates—share any surplus from a laxer 
offshore regulatory environment with their offshore financial services provider. It 
 
189. For example, to avoid regulations triggered by notional value thresholds, parties could have 
rewritten the terms of their swap transactions to decrease notional amounts while increasing applicable 
rates. Yet review of notional data following the implementation of Title VII shows that parties have 
not sought to exploit this loophole. 
190. One may argue that subsidiary treasury entities of U.S. persons should be treated 
differently than subsidiary treasury entities of non-U.S. persons. However, this argument must contend 
with the relative ease of changing the holding company domicile of a business and the relative 
competitiveness of U.S. and foreign businesses. The literature on the use of inversions to escape 
worldwide taxation of U.S. corporations provides decades of thoughtful analysis around these 
questions. See Omri Marian, Home-Country Effects of Corporate Inversions, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2015); 
Cathy Hwang, The New Corporate Migration: Tax Diversion Through Inversion, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 807 
(2014); Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines, Jr., Expectations and Expatriations: Tracing the Causes and 
Consequences of Corporate Inversions, 55 NAT’L TAX J. 409 (2002). 
191. Cross-Border Guidance, supra note 91, at 45,318. 
192. Id. at 45,319 (“Non-U.S. persons that are not guaranteed or conduit affiliates are not 
required to count swaps with a conduit affiliate towards the swap dealer de minimis calculation.”); id. 
at 45,324 n.310 (“Note that if a non-U.S. person that is not a guaranteed or conduit affiliate of a  
U.S. person engages in a swap dealing transaction with another non-U.S. person that is not a guaranteed 
affiliate of a U.S. person (including such non-U.S. person that is a swap dealer), then such swap dealing 
transaction does not count toward the de minimis threshold of the unregistered, swap dealing party.”). 
It is less clear whether the approach for skirting swap regulation described in this paragraph could work 
with a guaranteed non-U.S. subsidiary of a U.S. person as opposed to an affiliate conduit. 
193. Large trader reporting requirements may apply to some swap transactions between a  
non-U.S. person that is not a swap dealer providing swaps to a non-U.S. treasury affiliate. See id.  
at 45,364. 
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is perhaps out of concern for these structures that the CFTC smudged the ink and 




Figure IV.C.1: Non-U.S. Treasury Affiliate used to source swaps from 
non-U.S. entity providing swaps but not registered as a swap dealer. 
To date, however, empirical observation does not support theories that 
customers would shift their operations abroad in response to financial regulation. 
This observation is consistent with expected cost-benefit calculations that 
customers face in deciding whether to move operations to a foreign subsidiary to 
share in the savings from regulatory avoidance. 
As noted above, the use of non-U.S. treasury affiliates and the consequent 
avoidance of swap regulations are normatively gray. U.S. swap regulations may 
indeed reduce systemic risk, in which case regulation may be desirable and its 
avoidance a social cost.195 Systemic risk represents an externality, and if that 
 
194. Compare id. at 45,359 (indicating that only certain conditions to the inter-affiliate exemption 
and real time reporting would apply), with id. at 45,369 (indicating that transaction level requirements 
would apply although substituted compliance would be available). It is not clear if non-U.S. persons 
providing swap dealing services to conduit affiliates may be required to register as swap dealers, 
although it generally appears that such non-U.S. person could operate without  
registering: “Non-U.S. persons that are not guaranteed or conduit affiliates are not required to count 
swaps with a conduit affiliate towards the swap dealer de minimis calculation.” Id. at 45,319. 
195. Commercial end-users entering into a swap to hedge are usually exempt from clearing, 
platform execution and margin requirements suggesting that Congress and regulators do not view the 
systemic risks consequences as high. There are also impacts on market transparency and (under what 
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externality is not contained through other equally effective means, the avoidance of 
swap regulations will have social costs. This assumes that non-U.S. regime(s) for 
containing systemic risk are inferior to the U.S. regime.196 This patriotic assumption 
may have some validity; perhaps jurisdictions compete to house financial activity at 
the behest of powerful financial institution constituents or for other reasons; or 
perhaps jurisdictions differ in sizing systemic risk or the private costs of regulation, 
or differ in their views of optimal means for containing systemic risk.197 At the very 
least, the possibility that some jurisdictions do more to mitigate systemic risk enjoys 
broad acceptance in the literature. 
In summary, empirical evidence and theoretical considerations support that 
customers are unlikely to move in a manner that permits financial service providers 
to skirt regulatory obligations. This provides a measure of comfort that some policy 
goals may be achieved unilaterally. Yet as discussed above in Section IV.A.3, some 
methods of achieving customer protection may rely not only on activities within the 
customer-serving market but also other markets. The goal of enabling customers to 
take advantage of the same terms dealers offered one another through mandatory 
platform execution relied on inter-dealer trading remaining within the purview of 
U.S. regulation. The move of inter-dealer swap activity offshore thus undermined 
this method of allaying concerns with oligopolistic conduct among dealers. This 
shows that migration, even if it does not involve customers, can complicate the 
regulatory project by requiring use of less elegant tools such as  
traditional enforcement. 
2. Inter-dealer Activity Migrates 
As reflected in Figure III.A, the great majority of swap activity is conducted 
between a relatively small number of swap dealing institutions. Due to the immense 
volume of inter-dealer swap activity, the heavier regulatory burdens imposed on 
swap dealers, and their personnel’s expertise in financial structuring, greater 
mobility is to be expected of dealer-to-dealer transactions than customer serving 
transactions. At the risk of letting the tail wag the dog, it is also noteworthy that 
dealers are more likely to be comfortable without the certainty American legal 
institutions offer. Major financial institutions transacting with each other are less 
likely to demand the protections of developed legal and regulatory regimes due to 
relatively lower informational asymmetries, substantial reputational capital and 
expertise in tailoring contractual arrangements (which can substitute for the 
protections of public law). The private benefits of coordinated relocation are thus 
substantially higher and the costs substantially lower in the context of inter-dealer 
markets than customer markets. 
 
may be termed a paternalistic view) market integrity from the migration of transactions abroad through 
conduit affiliates. 
196. See supra note 9. 
197. See Jeffrey N. Gordon & Christopher Muller, Confronting Financial Crisis: Dodd-Frank’s 
Dangers and the Case for a Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund, 28 YALE J. REG. 151, 177–78 (2011). 
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As discussed above, the dramatic implosion of U.S. swap market activity seen 
in CFTC data is owed in substantial part to the movement of U.S. banks’ swap 
dealing operations into foreign subsidiaries. These swap activities do not involve 
U.S. counterparties, but rather non-U.S. persons that may have preexisted the 
promulgation of the CFTC’s cross-border guidance or have been established 
subsequently. These foreign counterparties may be subsidiaries of U.S. based 
financial institutions or may be foreign based financial institutions. And the 
migrating swap activities are truly conducted abroad rather than merely papered as 
between non-U.S. counterparties while being negotiated from the United States. 
Because they operate wholly outside the United States, these subsidiaries are exempt 
from registration as swap dealers and hence free from the panoply of Title VII 
regulations applicable to swap dealers. How problematic is this migration? 
Foreign subsidiaries of U.S. banks engaging in unregulated swaps trading with 
other major financial institutions risks accumulation of systemic risk in 
contravention of the policy animating Title VII.198 If as Congress concluded and 
many scholars argue, unsupervised interdependence between financial institutions 
established through opaque swap relationships contributed to the financial crisis, 
the re-creation of these unregulated webs offshore can be cause for concern.199 The 
concerning activities, however, take place in subsidiaries rather than U.S. banks 
directly and this adds a significant measure of protection. A fundamental premise 
of corporate law is that parents have no obligation for the liabilities of their 
subsidiaries provided that basic formalities are maintained.200 Yet this protection is 
qualified. First, the equity interest in the subsidiary may represent a material asset 
of the parent. Second, financial relationships with the subsidiary such as loans or 
derivatives may additionally expose the parent to losses in the event the subsidiary 
founders. Third, parents have been known to voluntarily bail out their children 
(notwithstanding fraudulent conveyance risk, fiduciary duties to parental 
shareholders, and other legal niceties). And fourth, co-branding, inter-affiliate 
service agreements, and other operational interdependencies between entities can 
undermine the parent when the subsidiary stumbles. Financial regulators should be 
wary of the buildup of systemic risk in offshore subsidiaries. 
Fortunately, regulators can be granted or already have tools to deal with 
systemic risk at the domestic parent level. The means to stem systemic risk discussed 
 
198. As discussed above, the offshoring also implicates market transparency concerns, and to a 
far lesser extent due to the institutions being generally able to fend for themselves, concerns of fraud 
and abuse. 
199. See Viral Acharya et al., The Financial Crisis of 2007–2009: Causes and Remedies, 18  
FIN. MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS & INSTRUMENTS 89 (2009); George W. Madison, Gary J. Cohen  
& William A. Shirley, Financial Regulatory Reform: Key Changes That Reduced Systemic Risk,  
BANK. & FIN. SERV. ( Jan. 2015). 
200. WILLIAM A. KLEIN, J. MARK RAMSEYER & STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, BUSINESS 
ASSOCIATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS ON AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS AND CORPORATIONS 
(Foundation Press, 10th ed. 2006). 
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here primarily relate to banks as opposed to non-bank affiliates within a bank 
holding company. Congress could, however, unilaterally expand the authority of the 
Federal Reserve to similarly police interactions between U.S. entities within a bank 
holding company and their foreign subsidiaries.201 
U.S. banking regulators may have legislative authority to limit the flow of risk 
between a U.S. bank and its foreign subsidiaries.202 For example, Basel III 
contemplates that national regulators will determine haircuts applicable to 
investments in consolidated subsidiaries.203 Under statutory authority to define 
capital standards, U.S. banking regulators can force greater discounts on equity in 
foreign subsidiaries than on domestic subsidiaries to account for the greater risk of 
unregulated activity.204 
Beyond capital requirements, banking agencies already have scaffolding for 
firewalling off unregulated activities of non-U.S. subsidiaries. The Federal Reserve 
has promulgated Regulation K, Subpart A205 to address the unique powers and 
obligations related to the foreign activities of U.S. banking organizations. Additional 
means exist for policing guarantees or other credit support that may make a  
U.S. entity liable for the obligations of its non-U.S. affiliates. Sections 23A/B 
restrict banks’ and their subsidiaries’ transactions with affiliates in part to reduce 
the risk of FDIC insurance being used to subsidize non-bank activity.206 Currently, 
transactions between banks and their subsidiaries are generally exempt from these 
restrictions.207 Restrictions on affiliate transactions could be expanded for  
non-U.S. subsidiaries of banks to protect the bank from its subsidiary’s default (and 
to prevent the bank from bailing out the subsidiary).208 Reliance on Sections  
 
201. Legislation could also capture arrangements between members of the U.S. shadow banking 
sector and their offshore affiliates. 
202. Non-bank swap dealers may emerge and, indeed, one famously has. Interest rate Derivatives 
House of the Year: Citadel Securities, supra note 125. The emergence of swap dealers unaffiliated with 
banks may require Congress to provide regulators with new authorities vis-à-vis hedge funds and other 
participants in the so called “shadow banking” sector. See Kathryn Judge, Information Gaps and Shadow 
Banking, 103 VA. L. REV. 411 (2017); Tobias Adrian & Adam B. Ashcraft, Shadow Banking: A Review 
of the Literature, in BANKING CRISES (Garett Jones ed., Palgrave Macmillan 2016). 
203. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL III 
DEFINITION OF CAPITAL – FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 10 (2017). The approach of limiting 
failure to an unregulated foreign subsidiary ex post rather than regulating the subsidiary ex ante to prevent 
it from taking on excessive risk is admittedly a second best approach. In another context, Stephen  
J. Lubben and Arthur Wilmarth have raised substantial questions as to whether large financial 
conglomerates can manage the liquidity of their affiliates in an independent manner that recognizes 
corporate separation (and counterparties’ abilities to monitor whether these practices are taking place) 
particularly in times of market stress. See Stephen J. Lubben & Arthur Wilmarth, Too Big and Unable to 
Fail, 69 FLA. L. REV. 1205, 1229 (2017). 
204. There is precedent for this approach in the treatment of bank financial subsidiary equity. 
See 12 C.F.R. § 3.22(a)(7) (2019). 
205. 12 C.F.R. §§ 211.1–.13 (2019). 
206. See Federal Reserve Act, §§ 23A–B, 12 U.S.C. §§ 371c to 371c-1 (2018). 
207. See id. § 23A(b)(2)(A). Financial subsidiaries are generally treated as affiliates rather than 
bank subsidiaries. Id. § 23A(e). 
208. See Cross-Border Guidance, supra note 91, at 45,320 (discussing implicit guarantees). 
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23A/B to police dependencies of U.S. banks and unregulated foreign subsidiaries 
may admittedly be an imperfect solution in practice as inter-affiliate arrangements 
are difficult to monitor, particularly in cases of informal agreements carried out by 
individuals with strong personal relationships or, in some cases, roles across 
multiple entities. Additional separation of roles and personnel may be necessary to 
further financial independence of banks from their foreign subsidiaries. 
To address some of the risk to customer relationships from foreign subsidiary 
default, banks can be required to use trademarks, branding, and other identification 
for foreign operations and the subsidiaries housing them that is unrelated to the 
parent bank. Banking regulators can prohibit banks from allowing cross-defaults 
triggered by foreign subsidiaries. And banking regulators can prohibit banks from 
bailing out their subsidiaries when an injection of funds could create instability for 
the parent institution. 
To deter diversion of parental assets to subsidiaries during times of stress, 
restrictions on asset contributions to foreign subsidiaries can be implemented. 
These restrictions may place caps on contributions during a given period or 
condition contributions on the absence of severely adverse market conditions. The 
former requires the parent to undertake a measured, deliberate policy when growing 
a foreign subsidiary and prevents bail outs. The latter prevents bailouts at a time 
when other financial institutions may be distressed. Either approach, however, may 
not work because during a crisis regulators may forbear from enforcement.209 It is 
unclear if our political institutions have the discipline to apply law in times of crisis, 
especially when the broader consequences are hard to predict and will result in some 
businesses failing in the short term.210 Ex ante prevention of risk concentration 
through international harmonization rather than ex post containment of risk 
through barriers between parents and subsidiaries during a crisis represents a 
potentially more efficient approach to stemming systemic risk. For that reason, 
regulating dealing activities similarly across the globe may be preferable to limiting 
blowback from activity through insulating U.S. entities from unregulated offshore 
affiliates. This is another example where unilateral solutions exist, though 
harmonization allows for more efficacious designs for achieving policy priorities. 
This example also shows how harmonization permits regulatory design to 
bypass shortcomings in domestic lawmaking institutions. The above proposal to 
cabin risk in foreign subsidiaries would require cooperation between the CFTC and 
SEC, on the one hand, and the banking regulators (e.g., the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Federal Reserve Board and the OCC), on the 
other hand, or at least an understanding of the former’s regulations by the latter.211 
 
209. See POSNER, supra note 3. 
210. See Saule T. Omarova, From Gramm-Leach-Bliley to Dodd Frank: The Unfulfilled Promise 
of Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, 89 N.C.L. REV. 1683 (2011) (explaining regulatory willingness 
to relax prohibitions on inter-affiliate transactions during the financial crisis). 
211. Judge, supra note 3, at 901 (discussing failure of coordination between Federal Reserve and 
SEC). 
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In other words, banking regulators would have to identify foreign subsidiaries of 
U.S. banks that would have been swap dealers under CFTC and SEC rules if they 
had been conducting their operations in the U.S. Banking regulators would further 
have to amend current rules governing bank subsidiaries to provide U.S. bank 
parents protection commensurate with the risk from unregulated conduct of their 
offshore subsidiaries. This poses an institutional problem where a host of banking 
regulators need to measure and fill a lacuna left by the territorial limitation of 
regulations written primarily by the CFTC and SEC. Yet this coordination problem 
is not predominantly owed to mobility of U.S. financial institutions but rather to 
the unique fragmentation of the U.S. financial regulatory system.212 Unlike most of 
its peer countries, the United States has splintered financial regulation across a 
multitude of agencies (serving, in part, the campaign finance goals of legislators 
controlling the distinct committees to which these agencies are beholden). These 
institutional features create challenges to effective unilateral regulation, which 
harmonization helps bypass. 
The discussion above shows how the migration of inter-dealer markets 
undermines the regulatory architecture developed to reduce systemic risk. It also 
shows that migration does not necessarily undermine policy goals in the absence of 
harmonization; rather, the susceptibility of a unilateral regime to relocation is 
determined jointly by the lawmakers architecting the regime and the private parties 
responding to it. As this example shows, design error or political compromise may 
lead lawmakers to architect regimes in manners susceptible to private parties opting 
out through relocation. 
The above concerns with migration and proposals for addressing it are 
premised on a nationalistic assumption that U.S. regulations strike the correct 
balance between social and private costs. It may be that U.S. regulations are overly 
strict while the regulations in the jurisdiction to which activities have migrated are 
overly lax. Viewing mobility as a form of undesirable avoidance assumes that the 
host jurisdiction has a relatively superior regime. It remains for future work to 
normatively assess the flight of U.S. swap activity abroad.213 
 
212. Kenneth W. Dam, The Subprime Crisis and Financial Regulation: International and 
Comparative Perspectives ( John M. Olin Program in Law and Econ., Working Paper No. 517, 2010), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1579048 [https://perma.cc/HYF8-M7S8] 
( last visited July 30, 2018); Sabrina R. Pellerin, John R. Walter & Patricia E. Wescott, The Consolidation 
of Financial Regulation: Pros, Cons, and Implications for the United States, 95 ECON. Q. 121 (2009); 
Howell E. Jackson, A Pragmatic Approach to the Phased Consolidation of Financial Regulation in the 
United States (Harv. Law Sch. Pub. Law and Legal Theory, Working PaperNo. 09-19, 2008), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1300431 [https://perma.cc/VPY5-US9T] ( last visited 
July 30, 2018); United States Department of the Treasury, Blueprint for a Modernized Financial 
Regulatory Structure (2008), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/
Blueprint.pdf [https://perma.cc/3FE9-FNSM ] ( last visited July 30, 2018). 
213. There is no serious contention that legislation regulating the financial industry is based on 
a wonkish calculus of benefits and costs. And the agencies implementing financial regulations are 
generally not constrained to promulgating only those regulations with positive net benefits. Jeffrey  
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CONCLUSION 
This preceding discussion develops the debate on the necessity of 
internationally harmonizing financial regulations. This conventional view was based 
on the supposition that financial institutions could relocate to subvert regulations. 
This Paper both substantiates the core concerns of international financial 
regulation—supporting that financial institutions do indeed relocate operations 
following regulatory intervention—and challenges that regulatory policy is 
categorically susceptible to such relocation. Depending on the policy goal, unilateral 
financial regulation may be more or less effective to achieve it. 
The applicability of regulations governing financial services does not turn on 
just the location of the services provider but also on the location of the customer. 
The rhetoric concerning “financial institutions” relocating, rather than “financial 
service providers” helps elide the reality that all financial activity directly or 
indirectly serves customers and involves at least two parties. The swap market 
experience presented in this paper shows that customers are less likely to relocate 
than services providers in the wake of regulations. This is not just an empirical 
observation. It is consistent with models of relative benefits and costs from 
relocation to customers and their suppliers. Customers tend to be subject to lighter 
regulatory burdens than service providers and to less frequently engage in regulated 
conduct. As a result, the relative benefits in regulatory savings of migrating 
customer-serving transactions are significantly lower than those of migrating 
transactions between financial services providers. Regulations aimed at markets 
 
N. Gordon, The Empty Call for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Financial Regulation, 43 J. LEG. STUD. S351 
(2014). Imminent scholars disagree as to the prospects for arriving at a cost-benefit based design of 
financial regulation, as opposed to design based on reasoned application of experience and judgment. 
Compare id., and Coates, supra note 114, with Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Cost-Benefit Analysis of 
Financial Regulations: A Response to Criticisms, 124 YALE L.J.F. 246 (2015) (arguing for further research 
and identifying that financial markets produce unusually high amounts of data that may be useful for 
measuring benefits and costs). Some of the same issues plaguing ex ante design stymie ex post 
measurement. For leading efforts in measuring systemic risk, which is perhaps the most slippery of the 
priorities of financial regulators, see efforts by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland to develop  
a public systemic risk indicator. System Risk Indicator, FED. RES. BANK CLEVELAND, https://
www.clevelandfed.org/our-research/indicators-and-data/systemic-risk-indicator.aspx [https://
perma.cc/4HX7-PDBJ] ( last visited Nov. 18, 2019). The indicator, however, is based on implied 
market expectations of bank default and does not provide a ready answer for how leverage,  
maturity-mismatch, inter-connectedness, opaque financial dependencies, or other variables commonly 
referenced as contributors affect systemic risk. Inability to measure and compare the health of 
regulatory environments across jurisdictions calls into question a swath of normative scholarship in 
financial regulation. Because there is no available measure for the quality of financial regulation, many 
scholarly discussions amount at best to expressions of judgment and informed guesswork. For example, 
it is difficult to understand whether a race-to-the bottom or top is taking place without being able to 
compare the quality of regulation, and similarly, recommendations for experimentation among 
jurisdictions do not address how the results of the experiment would be measured and learned from. 
Cf. Griffith, supra note 49, at 1293–94 (explaining calls for harmonization as based on concerns with a 
race to the bottom, while encouraging experimentation in part to separate successful from unsuccessful 
approaches to financial regulation). 
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between financial institutions and their customers such as those seeking customer 
protection goals are less likely to be susceptible to regulatory arbitrage  
through relocation. 
In contrast, markets between financial services providers are relatively more 
mobile. Thus, goals concerned with regulating these markets are more reliant on 
harmonization. Yet even in this context, unilateral financial regulation may be 
largely successful. If the goal is prevention of systemic risk inflow to U.S. financial 
institutions, restrictions on a U.S. parent may be adequate notwithstanding a liberal 
regime governing the activities of a foreign subsidiary. These restrictions, however, 
may be difficult to implement in practice due to institutional constraints such as 
challenges to inter-agency coordination and political over-rides in times of crisis. 
International harmonization is desirable not because of the mobility of financial 
institutions without more but because of shortcomings in our lawmaking apparatus, 
many of them self-imposed. 
The mobility of financial institutions, however, raises concerns beyond those 
of thwarting regulatory agendas. Migration of economic activity to avoid regulation 
creates what tax scholars214 refer to as deadweight loss. The migration also has 
distributive consequences as countries with laxer laws attract businesses and the 
attendant benefits such as greater employment and taxes. These costs of mobility 
itself, rather than the limitations mobility imposes on policy objectives motivating 
financial regulation, are a topic for subsequent scholarship. 
 
214. HENRY J. AARON & JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, HOW TAXES AFFECT ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 
BROOKINGS (1981). Deadweight loss figures prominently in the normative analysis of tax law, where 
it is a measure of private loss induced through legal intervention. This type of deadweight loss also 
occurs in response to financial and other regulation. As a harm, deadweight loss is not solely caused 
through government intervention and anti-trust scholarship provides a careful study of how private 
collusion can create deadweight loss relative to a competitive market baseline. See Douglas Melamed, 
Antitrust Law is not That Complicated Response, 130 HARV. L. REV. F. 163, 164 (2017). 
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APPENDIX A 
Swap Market Regulation Timeline215 
On December 31, 2012, swap dealers had to register as such.216  
On January 1, 2013, a number of swap dealer specific obligations came into 
effect: 
x Prohibitions on fraud;217 
x Providing the daily mark of swap transactions;218 
x Fair dealing standards applicable to swap dealer communications;219 
x Diligence on recommended swaps and strategies;220 
x Restrictions on political contributions;221 
x Risk management program;222 
x Business continuity requirements;223 
x Monitoring of position limits;224 
x Diligent supervision of swap personnel;225 
x Conflicts of interest policies and procedures;226 
x Accessibility of information to regulators;227 
x Antitrust considerations;228 
x Designation of chief compliance officer for already regulated 
entities;229 
x Portfolio compression for already regulated entities;230 
x Trade confirmation requirements;231 
 
215. For sources, see MAYER BROWN LLP, BY WHEN? – THE CFTC’S DODD-FRANK 
COMPLIANCE DATES, https://www.isda.org/a/1niDE/df-effectiveness-timelines.pdf [https://
perma.cc/VVF4-BU8L] ( last visited Nov. 18, 2019); Swaps Made Available to Trade Determination, 
CFTC, https://sirt.cftc.gov/sirt/sirt.aspx?Topic=%20SwapsMadeAvailableToTradeDetermination 
[https://perma.cc/FMY6-35MW] ( last visited Nov. 18, 2019); SWAPS MADE AVAILABLE TO TRADE 
(Feb. 18, 2014), https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@otherif/documents/
file/swapsmadeavailablechart.pdf [https://perma.cc/XVW7-BRHZ]. ( last visited Nov. 18, 2019) 
216. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 3.10, 23, 23.21–22, 170.16 (2019). 
217. See id. § 23.410(a), (b). 
218. See id. § 23.431(d). 
219. See id. 
220. See id. 
221. See id. 
222. See id. § 23.600. 
223. See id. § 23.603. 
224. See id. § 23.601. 
225. See id. § 23.602. 
226. See id. § 23.605. 
227. See id. § 23.606. 
228. See id. § 23.607. 
229. See id. § 3.3. 
230. See id. § 23.503. 
231. See id. § 23.501. 
Second to Printer_Beylin (Do Not Delete) 2/26/2020  10:56 AM 
554 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:497 
On March 10, 2013, portfolio compression became mandatory for swap 
dealers that were not subject to regulation prior to registration as swap dealers;232 
On March 11, 2013, swap clearing became mandatory with respect to major 
swaths of the interest rate and credit default swap market where the transaction was 
between so called “Category 1 Entities” (which include swap dealers and very large 
private funds);233 
On April 3, 2013, swap dealers that were not subject to regulation prior to 
registering as swap dealers had to designate a chief compliance officer;234 
On May 1, 2013, a number of additional regulations became applicable to swap 
dealers: 
x General provisions such as anti-evasion rules and know your 
counterparty rules became applicable;235 
x Confidential treatment of counterparty information;236 
x Verification of counterparty eligibility to enter into swaps and status 
as a special entity (e.g., governmental body, retirement plan, 
endowment);237 
x Counterparty disclosures, including pre-trade mid-market mark and 
scenario analysis;238 
x Clearing related disclosure;239 
x Institutional suitability;240 
x Requirements applicable to swap dealers acting as advisors or 
counterparties to special entities;241 
One June 10, 2013, the second batch of entities became subject to clearing 
requirement (these include all private funds and entities predominantly engaged in 
activities that are financial in nature);242 
On July 1, 2013, swap dealers had to begin portfolio reconciliation with their 
counterparties;243 
On September 9, 2013, all remaining entities became subject to clearing 
requirement;244 
 
232. See id. § 23.503. 
233. See id. §§ 39, 50. 
234. See id. § 3.3. 
235. See id. § 23.402. 
236. See id. § 23.410(c). 
237. See id. §§ 23.401, 23.430. 
238. See id. § 23.431(a)–(c). 
239. See id. § 23.432. 
240. See id. § 23.434(a)(2), (b), (c). 
241. See id. §§ 23.440, 23.450. 
242. See id. §§ 39, 50. 
243. See id. § 23.502. 
244. See id. §§ 39, 50. 
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On February 15, 2014, the first set of interest rate and credit default swaps 
became subject to the platform execution requirement.245 
On September 1, 2016, the variation margin requirement came into effect for 
swap dealers with the largest outstanding notional amounts of uncleared swaps;246 
On March 1, 2017, the rest of the swap dealers became subject to variation 
margin requirements (although this was separately delayed until Sept. 1, 2017 under 
































245. See Swaps Made Available to Trade, supra note 215.  
246. See 17 C.F.R. § 23.153. 
247. See id. 
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